Failure to fulfill the terms of a lease deed can justify the re-entry of possession by the lessor.

Biswanath Somadder, J.

1. Let the affidavit of service filed in Court today be taken on record.

In re: CAN 639 of 2018

2. This is an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act.

3. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties and upon perusing the instant application for condonation of delay, it appears that sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant/applicant to explain the delay in filing of the appeal. As such, the delay is condoned. The application for condonation of delay, being CAN 639 of 2018, is accordingly allowed.

In re: MAT 92 of 2018 with CAN 638 of 2018

4. By consent of the parties, the appeal is treated as on day’s list and taken up for consideration along with the application for stay.

5. The instant appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 23rd October, 2017, passed by a learned Single Judge in WP 1676 (W) of 2017 (Suresh Rabidas vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.). By the impugned judgment and order, the writ petition of Suresh Rabidas was dismissed. He has now preferred the instant appeal.

6. Even a bare perusal of the records reveal that the appellant/writ petitioner had acquired a leasehold interest in a land measuring an area of 2678 square feet in Mouza – Gopinathpur under Police Station – Coke Oven, District – Burdwan, on the basis of a lease deed dated 30th December, 1989, executed by and between the appellant/writ petitioner and the State of West Bengal. Admittedly, the possession of the land was taken over by the appellant/ writ petitioner on 31st January, 1991. According to the covenants contained in the lease deed, the appellant/writ petitioner was supposed to make construction and start production within a period of one year from the date of execution of the lease deed. Admittedly, the appellant/writ petitioner never completed construction nor started production in terms of the lease agreement even till the date when the leased land was resumed by the concerned authority of State, i.e., on 20th January, 2017. By suppressing relevant documents which reveal that the appellant/writ petitioner had from time to time approached the concerned authority of the State seeking extension of time to construct and to start production, which he never did between January, 1991 till 20th January, 2017, he approached the writ Court seeking mandatory orders in his favour. A report in the form of an affidavit had been called for by the learned Single Judge and the suppressed documents were revealed in the said report by the concerned authority of the State. The appellant/writ petitioner’s several applications made before the concerned authority of the State seeking extension of the period of time of completion of construction work from the year 2003 till the year 2017 were taken note of by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge observed to the effect that construction work on the leasehold land was not done by the appellant/writ petitioner during long period of 27 years and thereby the appellant/writ petitioner had violated the terms of the lease deed for which the State respondent had the right to re-enter possession of the land-in-question. Considering this aspect of the matter and for such other reasons which have been recorded in details in the impugned judgment and order, the learned Single Judge proceeded to dismiss the writ petition.

7. In an Intra-Court Mandamus Appeal, no interference is usually warranted unless palpable infirmities or perversities are noticed. In the instant case, even a bare perusal of the impugned judgment and order does not reveal any such palpable infirmity or perversity. Moreover, the impugned judgment and order is supported with cogent reasons.

8. For reasons stated above, the appeal and the application for stay are liable to be dismissed and stand accordingly dismissed.

9. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties.

I agree.

Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.