The main legal point established is the binding effect of the Suhas H. Pophale judgment, the interpretation of previous judgments, and the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer.

SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J.

1. These two revisional applications are taken up together, since both arise from the same proceeding and are thematically connected.

2. C.O. No. 721 of 2018 has been preferred against an order dated February 5, 2018, whereby the challenge taken out by the petitioner to the maintainability of a proceeding under Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1971 Act”) was turned down.

3. By virtue of C.O. No. 1034 of 2018, a subsequent order dated May 2, 2018, closing evidence and arguments in the same proceeding, on the prayer of the present petitioner for adjournment on the ground of pendency of C.O. No. 721 of 2018, has been challenged.

4. Since the second revisional application is consequent to the first, C.O. No. 721 of 2018 is taken up for adjudication prior to C.O. No. 1034 of 2018.

5. In the present case, admittedly the petitioner was in occupation of the disputed premises as a lessee from prior to September 16, 1958. On November 19, 1988, the opposite party issued a notice to the petitioner to vacate possession of the said premises immediately on the ground of sub-letting and change of user.

6. Subsequently, on May 2, 2017 a notice to quit was issued by the opposite party, thereby terminating the tenancy of the petitioner and asking the petitioner to quit, vacate and deliver up vacant and peaceful possession of 3327 sq. ft on the ground floor, southern side of flat no. 1, “National Garden”, 1B, Judges’ Court Road, Kolkata-700027, on or before expiry of May 31, 2017.

7. The short questions which fall for adjudication in the present revisions are:

i. Does the two-Judge Division Bench judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Suhas H. Pophale vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and its Estate Officer - (2014) 4 SCC 657, still hold the field or, being contrary to the judgment rendered in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and another vs. Punjab National Bank and others – (1990) 4 SCC 406, rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court and the judgment of M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another – AIR 1981 SC 670, rendered by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, can be said to have binding effect?

ii. If Suhas H. Pophale (supra) is binding on this Court, whether the precedent laid down therein holds true only in the context of State Rent Control Acts or also the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?

8. The petitioner argues that since admittedly the petitioner came into possession of the disputed premises as a lessee under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the termination of such jural relationship in terms of Section 4 of the 1971 Act was de hors the law, vitiating the consequential proceeding under Section 5 of the 1971 Act.

9. It is argued that Suhas H. Pophale (supra) itself holds that the said judgment clarified and explained Ashoka Marketing (supra) and as such, Suhas H. Pophale (supra) was neither hit by the principle of per incuriam nor by the principle of sub silentio.

10. Placing reliance on several paragraphs of Suhas H. Pophale (supra), learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the said judgment followed Ashoka Marketing (supra) and M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company (supra) and only explained and clarified the full scope of operation of those judgments. The question as to the applicability of the 1971 Act prior to September 16, 1958, that is the date from which the Act originally came into force, was not considered in Ashoka Marketing (supra) at all. Suhas H. Pophale (supra) categorically laid down that two categories of occupants of the public corporations were excluded from the coverage of the 1971 Act.

First, those who were in occupation since prior to September 16, 1958, when the Act became applicable, who were clearly outside the coverage of the Act.

Secondly, those who came in occupation thereafter, but prior to the date of the premises concerned belonging to a gover