The provisions of the 1996 Act provide an independent forum and procedure that do not infringe upon the domain of the 2006 Act, and the Court cannot stay the arbitral proceedings under Section 29-A(4) of the 1996 Act.

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.

The aforesaid three revisional applications, arising out of connected orders, are taken up for hearing together. Despite repeated service, the opposite party is not represented and as such, the matters are taken up for hearing ex parte.

2. In an agreement entered into between the parties on March 3, 2014, there was an arbitration clause. By virtue of the said clause, the parties had agreed to refer the difference, disputes or questions arising between them as to the meaning or effect of the agreement or as to the rights or liabilities of the parties arising thereunder or any matters or things relating to the agreement or arising out of or in connection therewith, either during the continuance of the agreement or after any termination or purported termination thereof, to an arbitrator to be appointed by the petitioner-company only. Such arbitral proceeding was to be held in Kolkata in accordance with, and subject to, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1996 Act’).

3. Upon disputes having arisen between the parties, the petitioner appointed an arbitrator of its choice by a letter dated April 1, 2016.

4. Subsequently, the petitioner received a notice under Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2006 Act”) from a Facilitation Council at Thane, Maharashtra, formed under the said Act, intimating the petitioner that the petitioner was required to appear before the said council and submit its defence statement within fifteen days from the date of such notice, failing which ex parte orders would be passed. From such notice, the petitioner learnt that the opposite party had filed a petition under Section 18(1) of the 2006 Act.

5. On April 18, 2016, a representation was made on behalf of the petitioner before the said Facilitation Council intimating the council that an arbitrator had already been appointed pursuant to the arbitration agreement between the parties and that the arbitral proceedings had already commenced under the 1996 Act. By such representation, the Facilitation Council was requested to keep the proceedings before it in abeyance and not to take any further steps therein. Thereafter a letter was issued on behalf of the opposite party to the petitioner containing certain allegations against the petitioner.

6. The first sitting of the reference under the 1996 Act was held on April 29, 2016. Thereafter several sittings were held by the arbitrator. After taking several adjournments, the opposite party filed its counter-statement before the sole arbitrator. Subsequently a demurrer application was filed by the opposite party, challenging the jurisdiction of the sole arbitrator to entertain the dispute, primarily on the ground that a proceeding was already pending under the 2006 Act. Vide order dated March 23, 2017, the sole arbitrator dismissed the demurrer application by the opposite party on the ground that Section 16 of the 1996 Act specifically provided that such an application had to be made prior to the filing of the statement of defence and that the opposite party had failed to do so. Meanwhile, at the 12th sitting of the arbitral reference, held on March 17, 2017, the arbitrator informed the parties that the period of 12 months, as stipulated in Section 29-A(1) of the 1996 Act, would expire on March 31, 2017 and as such, an extension of the said time would be required for the arbitrator to proceed with the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner proposed to have the time extended by a further period of 6months as envisaged in Section 29-A of the 1996 Act.

7. However, at the 13th sitting, held on March 21, 2017, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party handed over a letter dated March 21, 2017 conveying that the opposite party did not wish to consent to the extension of