The main legal point established in the judgment is that the property was found to be a waqf property despite technical irregularities in the resolution of the Board of Waqf, and the suit was barred by Section 89 of the Waqf Act.

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.

1. The present revisional applications arise from connected matters. C.O. No. 749 of 2018 arises from Suit No. 3 of 2002 which was dismissed by the Waqf Tribunal on April 10, 2006. The suit was filed by Amjad Ali Mirza, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, for declaration of his title in the suit property and ancillary reliefs, claiming that the suit property was secular.

2. C.O. No. 750 of 2018 arises from a resolution taken in a meeting of the Board of Waqf dated October 14, 1999 declaring the suit properties to be waqf properties.

3. The two revisional applications were initially filed as writ petitions and thereafter converted to applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, giving rise to C.O. Nos. 749 and 750 of 2018.

4. The petitioners argue that the impugned resolution dated October 14, 1999 was entirely devoid of reasons. Even the appellate order, affirming such resolution, was cryptic. The appeal was decided merely by observing that the appeal was governed by the dismissal of the suit mentioned above, since the suit was allegedly filed challenging the resolution-in- question. The appellate forum did not give any reasons apart from the same. However, leaned counsel for the petitioners submits that the suit was not merely challenging the resolution. On the contrary, it is submitted that the primary reliefs in the plaint of the said suit pertained to a declaration that the suit properties were never waqf in nature, a declaration that the plaintiff has absolute right, title and interest in the 'A' schedule properties and that the 'B', 'C' and 'D' schedule properties belonged to the Baitun Najat Imambara Trust along with other consequential declarations and injunction. As such, it is argued that the said premise of the appellate order was erroneous in law and the appellate forum refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law in not interfering with the resolution-in-dispute.

5. Apart from the resolution being unreasoned, the board of waqf overlooked the exhaustive evidence adduced by the petitioners and, in virtually a single-sentence order, concluded that the disputed property was a waqf property, only on the basis of a deed dated July 31, 1926 and verbal submissions of the parties.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the opposite parties' case was full of contradictions. In the same breath, the waqf was claimed to be created by the late Nawab Wazid Ali Shah as well as by the deed of 1926. This apart, it was also mentioned in the pleadings of the private opposite party (opposite party no. 4) that the 1926 deed comprised of a purchase, thereby defeating the case of the opposite parties that the said deed created a waqf.

7. It was further argued that in the same breath the opposite party no. 4 had claimed that the suit property was enrolled on the basis of a waqf deed, the deed of 1926 being the basis of enrolment, as well as by virtue of long user.

8. It was admitted by the D.W. 1 in the suit that two rooms were designated for mutawallis but that the mother of the D.W. 1, that is, Kobra Begum and Yakub and others resided in a large portion than two rooms. The D.W. 1 admitted that he could not say whether the enrolment application was made before 1989. However, it appears from the enrolment application, which was a part of the records, that both Kobra and Khurshid Begum applied for enrolment of the disputed property as a waqf property in the year 1989, whereas the D.W. 1 stated in his evidence that his mother had been living as mutawalli since 1973 in the suit property. Further, the board's witness did not file any letter of authority in court to adduce evidence.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that no dedication as waqf, as pleaded by the private opposite parties, either by Nawab Wazid Ali Shah or by the 1926 deed, was proved either before the Board of Waqf or before the tribunal.

10. Although it was held by the tribunal that the pla