The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of satisfying the criteria of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure in allowing amendments after the commencement of trial.

JUDGMENT :

1. The present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arises from an order allowing an amendment of plaint.

2. The opposite parties filed the suit for the following reliefs:

"(a) A Decree declaring the defendant as trespasser in the suit property as he does not possess any right, title, interest and possession in the property mentioned in the Schedule.

(b) A decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his men and agents from disturbing and/or not to make any construction by changing the nature and character of the suit property.

(c) Cost of the suit.

(d) Any other relief/reliefs as the plaintiff is entitled to law and equity."

3. In the said suit, initially the opposite parties had filed an application for amendment of plaint, which was partially allowed by an order dated April 20, 2011.

4. Subsequently, after the commencement of trial, the opposite parties took out another application for amendment of plaint, which was allowed by the impugned order dated March 8, 2019.

5. The primary grievance of the defendant/petitioner in the present revision is that the said subsequent amendment was allowed in contravention of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No explanation was given for taking out the amendment after the commencement of trial, although it is apparent from the proposed amendments that the plaintiffs/opposite parties must have had knowledge of the said allegations previously.

6. It is further argued that the second amendment was barred by the principle of res-judicata, since the same sought to bring on record certain allegations, introduction of which was refused by the trial court while deciding the previous amendment application.

7. It is pointed out from an order dated May 30, 2010, by which the trial court rejected an application for injunction filed by the opposite parties, that the nine deeds sought to be challenged, inter-alia, by the current amendment were all disclosed in the trial court previously, as recorded in the said order of refusal of injunction. It is further argued, by placing reliance on certain portions of the written statement filed by the defendant/ petitioner in the court below on September 1, 2004, in particular paragraph no. 7(d) of the said written statement, that the relevant facts about the nine deeds-in-question had been disclosed by the petitioner in its pleadings. As such, there was no reason for the opposite parties to wait for fourteen years to file the amendment application, challenging such deeds and the relief sought to be introduced, challenging such deeds, was palpably time-barred.

8. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next argues that the reliefs of recovery of possession and mandatory injunction, and the associated allegations, also sought to be brought on record by the second amendment, were time-barred as well. It is submitted that the cause of action, if any, for such relief arose, even as per the plaint case, on July 29, 2003 and became time-barred after the lapse of twelve years from the said date. By placing reliance on paragraph nos. 7 and 11 of the plaint, as those stood originally, learned senior counsel for the petitioner argues that the plaintiffs/opposite parties categorically alleged that the defendant/petitioner, with the help of its men and agents, had gathered building materials to encroach upon the suit property and had attempted to make constructions forcefully on the property. Although in the very next paragraph, the plaintiffs had averred that the defendant has no possession, the said averment was belied by the original relief (b) sought in the plaint, which was not intended to protect the alleged possession of the plaintiffs but to restrain the defendant/petitioner from making construction and changing the nature and character of the suit property, thereby implying that the defendant/petitioner was in possession even at the juncture of filing of the suit.

9. Learned senior counsel cites, in