The main legal point established in the judgment is the obligation to comply with a status quo order and the entitlement to restoration of electric supply in case of a violation of the order.

JUDGMENT :

1. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

2. On July 30, 2009, the opposite party no.2 Infinity Infotech Parks Ltd., a lessee in respect of the suit premises, entered into an agreement of sub-lease with opposite party no. 1, Pearl Studios Pvt. Ltd.

3. Subsequently, the opposite party no. 1 inducted one Mahuaa Media Private Limited as a further sub-lessee.

4. By a tripartite agreement dated October 5, 2013, between the said Mahuaa Media, the opposite party no. 1 and the petitioner, Mahuaa assigned its sub-lease under Pearl Studios to the present petitioner, namely, Shiva Jute Mills Pvt. Ltd.

5. Both the said agreements contained various provisions regarding the payments to be made by the respective sub-lessees. Subsequently, upon a dispute having arisen as to the outstanding payments, the matter was referred to an arbitrator in the month of July, 2014, between the opposite parties, without impleading the petitioner.

6. In the year 2016, the petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated October 5, 2013 and consequential reliefs. Upon an injunction application being moved in the said suit, the trial court passed an ex parte ad interim order directing both parties to maintain status quo as regards possession, nature and character of the suit property as on that date. Such status quo was extended from time to time.

7. In the year 2017, the petitioner filed an application for being added as a party to the arbitral proceeding, which was rejected in December, 2018.

8. Meanwhile, in the month of September, 2018, the petitioner alleged that the opposite parties disconnected the petitioner's electric connection to the B schedule property of the plaint and made an application for restoration of such electric connection, alternatively a direction upon the WBSEDCL to give electric connection in the B schedule property in the name of the plaintiff. Vide order dated January 10, 2019, the said restoration application was dismissed on contest, against which the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that although the objection as to the agreement dated October 5, 2013 being insufficiently stamped and unregistered was raised by the opposite parties in the court below, the trial court left the said question open to be decided at the time of trial since the petition-in-question was for restoration of electricity and not connected with the issue of impoundment. However, for abundant caution, learned counsel argues on the said question as well. It is submitted that since the first limb of the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act exempts registration of a contract in suits for specific performance, for the purpose of being admissible in evidence, there was no bar for the court below to act on the unregistered agreement. In this context, learned counsel cites two decisions, reported respectively at (2010) 5 SCC 401 [S. Kaladevi vs. V.R. Somasundaram and others] and at (2018) 7 SCC 639 [Ameer Minhaj vs. Dierdre Elizabeth (Wright) Issar and others].

10. As far as Section 35 of the Stamp Act is concerned, it is argued that there was no bar in passing an injunction order or granting restoration of electricity even on an insufficiently stamped document, although the question of impoundment would arise once the document is tendered in evidence at the peremptory hearing stage.

11. In support of such proposition, learned counsel cites a division bench judgment reported at (2009) 4 CHN 415 [GTZ (India Private Limited) vs. Power Electronic Engineers & Ors.] as well as another division bench judgment reported at (2010) 4 CHN (Cal) 18 [Gopal Kumar Bhalotia & Anr. vs. Anirudh Trade and Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.]. In both the said judgments, it was held that failure to stamp a document properly does not affect the validity of the transaction embodied in the document. It was further held that injunction cannot be refused simply because