The court emphasized the duty of the employer to treat sexual harassment as misconduct under the service rules and initiate disciplinary action in accordance with those rules, as provided by the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.

JUDGMENT :

1. This writ petition has been filed challenging the memorandum no.F.NO.G:142:02:2019 issued by the President of the Institute of Cost Accountants of India, dated February 19, 2019.

2. The petitioner filed a complaint under Section 9 of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) dated November 17, 2016 against the respondent no.7, alleging that the said respondent had humiliated and mentally harassed her by using abusive language, words with dual meaning and sexually coloured remarks on several occasions in the year 2015, more particularly August, 2015 and on later occasions further harassed her, by denying leave on medical grounds.

3. Proceedings before the Internal Complaints Committee (in short ICC) commenced on the satisfaction of the ICC that it was a fit case to be dealt with under Section 9 of the said Act. On April 21, 2017 the ICC gave it's recommendation under Section 13(3) of the said Act. On May 22, 2017 the petitioner lodged a First Information Report at the New Market Police Station and on the basis thereof, New Market Police Station Case NO.219 of 2017 dated May 22, 2017 under Section 354A of the Indian Panel Code was started. The investigation resulted in the submission of a charge sheet. The matter is pending trial before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court at Kolkata. Aggrieved by the recommendation of the ICC the respondent no.7 filed W.P. No.329 of 2017. The petitioner also being aggrieved by the delay on the part of the employer, namely, the Institute of Cost Accountants of India (hereinafter referred to as the institute), in implementing the recommendation of the ICC, filed W.P. No. 15088 (W) of 2017. Both the writ petitions were considered analogously by a learned Single Judge, of this Court and by an order dated July 18, 2017 the learned Single Judge disposed of both the writ petitions by granting liberty to the parties to approach the statutory appellate authority under Section 18 of the said Act. Pursuant to the liberty granted, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) (in short DCLC) on July 21, 2017 in terms of Section 18 of the said Act, read with Rule 11 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules).

The said appeal was returned to the petitioner on September 12, 2017 by the office of the DCLC (Central), by enclosing a memorandum bearing No.F.No.22/(53)/2017-LS.II dated August 25, 2017 by which, the petitioner was informed that the DCLC (Central) was not the appellate authority and the appeal was thus being returned. Aggrieved by the said communication the petitioner filed another writ petition bearing no.W.P.No.25485 (W) of 2017. The said writ petition is pending before this court. Thereafter, the petitioner received a copy of the memorandum no. F.NO.G:142:02:2019 dated February 19, 2019 issued by the President of the Institute, that is, the respondent no.3 herein, from which the petitioner came to know that the respondent no.7 had been issued a show cause notice on September 12, 2018 calling upon the respondent no.7 to respond to the report of the ICC and on consideration of the response of the respondent no.7, the respondent no.3 remitted the matter back to the ICC with a direction for submission of a fresh report after consideration of the examinations, cross-examinations of the witnesses and all other submissions made by the petitioner and the respondent no.7. Aggrieved by the aforementioned memorandum dated February 19, 2019 the instant writ petition has been filed.

4. Mr. Kallol Bose, learned Advocate appearing on the behalf of the writ petitioner challenged the impugned memorandum primarily on four grounds. His first ground being that the respondent No.3 was not the appellate authority and did not have jurisdiction to issue the impugned memorand