The main legal point established in the judgment is the obligation of the manufacturer to maintain separate accounts for inputs used in the manufacture of dutiable and exempted goods under Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, and the interpretation of the first Explanation to the sub-rule.

JUDGMENT :

1. The assessee questions the propriety of an order-in- original on the ground that it completely misread a judgment of the Tribunal that was binding on it and it failed to notice an explanation to a provision that was applicable in the present case.

2. In short, the case made out by the appellant assessee is that the adjudicating authority acted in error of jurisdiction in passing the order impugned.

3. The order of the adjudicating authority was amenable to appeal. However, the Commissioner (Appeals) could not entertain the appeal since it was filed beyond the period permitted and the additional period of 30 days as envisaged by the appellate provision. The appellate authority held that in view of the wording of the provision, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to condone any delay beyond 30 days after the expiry of the usual period permitted to carry an appeal. Such order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was carried before the Tribunal. However, the appeal was withdrawn.

4. It is the submission of the appellant that since the Commissioner (Appeals) had declined to entertain the appeal on merits as it had been filed beyond the period of limitation and the further period within which the appeal could be entertained, there was no grievance against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) that could be pursued before the Tribunal in the further appeal and, hence, such appeal was withdrawn.

5. After abandoning the further appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee challenged the order-in-original dated May 7, 2008 by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held by the order impugned herein dated March 6, 2017 that upon the assessee having exhausted the remedies available, the order of adjudication could not have been assailed in this extraordinary jurisdiction. The Union seeks to support the order impugned on such ground, particularly, since the appeal against the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) was withdrawn without any liberty to approach any other forum.

6. The right to approach a constitutional Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 thereof does not require the permission or liberty of any other forum. Qualitatively, the authority exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution is not akin to appellate authority. As long as it is demonstrated that the quasi-judicial order questioned in this jurisdiction is on account of the breach of the principles of natural justice or in the erroneous exercise of jurisdiction or the like, the writ petition can be entertained, though a constitutional Court always has the discretion to not grant any relief on other grounds which are required to be recorded. In the present case, it is evident that a jurisdictional error may have been committed by the adjudicating authority that the assessee did not get a chance to address on merits because of the delay on the assessees part to move the appeal.

7. The matter pertains to Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. Such Rule pertains to the obligation of the manufacturer to make a distinction in maintaining accounts relating to the use of inputs in taxable and exempted goods if inputs on which CENVAT credit has been availed of are used in the manufacture of both exempted goods and taxable goods. Broadly speaking, if the manufacturer avails of CENVAT credit in respect of inputs and manufactures final products which are chargeable to duty or tax as well as final products that are exempted goods, then the manufacturer is required to maintain separate accounts for receipt, consumption and inventory of inputs for use in the manufacture of dutiable final products and separate accounts for similar purpose for use of the exempted inputs in the manufacture of exempted goods. Rule 6(3)(a) of the said Rules of 2004 provides a scheme. However, since the appellant in this case did not follow such scheme, the same is not relevant for the present purpose. Rule 6(3)(b) of the said Rules of 2004 pro