The gravity of economic offenses, lack of absolute guarantee against arrest, and the possibility of compounding offenses under the CGST Act are key legal principles established in the judgment.

JUDGMENT

Shivakant Prasad, J. - The petitioner has renewed his prayer for bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as his earlier application being CRM No. 10075 of 2019 was rejected by this Court vide order dated 24.12.2019. The petitioner prayer for bail was lastly rejected by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court, Alipore, 24 Parganas (South) vide order dated 31.12.2019 which is evident from the Annexure-P1 being the orders. The petitioner as I have been found in the earlier order that he is a Chartered Accountant by profession and with the similar contention he has averred that he is no way connected with the instant case. The petitioner has been arraigned as an accused in this case under Section 69 read with Section 132(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on the allegation that in connivance with the other accused persons, namely, Sanjay Kumar Pandit, Nagendra Kumar Dubey alias Sandip Dube, and Mr. Vijay Rajpuriya along with various other persons he allegedly issued GST Invoices without any supply of the goods or services to anybody on commission basis causing loss of more than 98 crores approximately.

2. It is submitted that the petitioner is in custody since 06.6.2019 and his further detention is not warranted as the Charge-sheet has already been submitted on completion of the investigation.

3. It is also submitted that the petitioner is no way responsible person as no notice was issued under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 and has been falsely entangled in this case as he is neither a proprietor nor a person responsible for the running of any proprietary business.

4. Mr. Sekhar Basu learned senior counsel for the petitioner reiterated that the prosecution has been lodged without the sanction of the Commissioner which is absolutely contrary to mandates provided under Section 134 of CGST Act as the Commissioner has only authorized the Investigating Officer to arrest under Section 69 read with Section 132(1) of the CGST Act but has not granted sanction under Section 134 of the CGST Act and as such the instant prosecution is not maintainable.

5. It is further pointed out that the peitioner is now extremely sick and suffering from severe chest pain and viral fever from long time and despite his repeated request proper medical treatment was not provided by the authority, despite knowing the fact that the petitioner has been hospitalized from 25th May, 2019 to 28th May, 2019 for proper medical care.

6. It is also submitted that the petitioner has not supplied any goods or services or both and did not issue any invoice in violation of the provisions of CGST Act, 2017 with the intention to evade tax or any of the offence enumerated in Section 132 of the CGST Act, 2017. Accordingly, the petitioner has renewed his prayer for his release on bail in connection with this case now pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court, Alipore, 24- Parganas (South).

7. It woud appear from the Order-sheet of the Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court, Alipore, 24- Parganas (South) vide order dated 19.02.2020 that case has been posted on 3rd March, 2020 for production of the accused from custody and for consideration of charge.

8. Mr. K.K. Maity learned counsel for the opposite party-Union of Inddia reference to a decision in case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S.A. Raja, 2006 1 SCC(Cri) 58 to submit that second application in absence of change in circumstances, the principle of res-judicate are not applicable to bail applications, but repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.

9. Reliance is also placed to case in State of Gujarat vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and another, 1987 SCC(Cri) 364 to argue that long incarceration in fail is no ground for releasing the accused on bail as in the cited case it has been held that mere fact that six years had elapsed, for which timelag the prosecution was in no way responsible, was no good gr