The main legal point established in the judgment is that agents of the original lessee are bound by an eviction order against the principal occupant, and the Estate Officer has the authority to pass the eviction order.

JUDGMENT

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. - The petitioners have preferred the present writ petition seeking various reliefs, in effect challenging an order granting eviction under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the P.P. Act"), primarily on the ground of violation of natural justice. The petitioners were not parties to the said proceeding.

2. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that, in view of the respondent no.1 having admitted that the petitioners have been in possession of the disputed premises, the petitioners were necessary parties to the proceeding under Section 5(1) of the P.P. Act. In fact, the respondent no.1 had sought an amendment to its eviction petition to implead the petitioner no. 1 (also referred to as "Big Bazaar") as a party to the proceeding, by an application dated December 12, 2014. In the said application, the respondent no.1 admitted the petitioner no.1 to be "currently in occupation" of the suit premises. However, vide order dated November 30, 2015, it was held by the Estate Officer that the impleadment of the petitioners was not "strictly necessitated in the scheme of the Act", since the orders under Section 5(1) and Section 7(2) of the P.P. Act bound whosoever was in occupation. The premise of the said finding, it is argued, was bad in law, since the eviction order would directly affect the present petitioners, who were in admitted occupation of the premises-in-question.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues, by placing reliance on the judgment of Krishna Ram Hahale (Dead) by his Lrs. vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131 , that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had the right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. The said judgment was rendered in connection with a proceeding under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

4. By referring to Delhi Development Authority vs. Anant Raj Agencies Private Limited, (2016) 11 SCC 406 , learned counsel for the petitioner argues that although the Respondent No. 1 heavily relied on the proposition of such judgment, that if the original lessee has been in unauthroised occupation of the property in question and the respondent therein had been illegally inducted in possession of the same by the original lessee, who himself was in unauthorised possession of the property, both are liable to pay damages and that the sale of the property by the original lessee in favour of the respondent therein was not a valid assignment of his right in respect of the same and the sale deed was not binding on the landlord. In the said judgment, even the concerned High Court's order substituting the respondent therein under Order XXII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was held to be bad in law.

5. Distinguishing Delhi Development Authority (supra), learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the same has no application in the instant case. It arose out of a civil suit involving eviction and the question involved was whether mere acceptance of rent after expiry of the lease amounts to renewal of lease. Moreover, it is argued, the unauthorised occupant was made a party in the second appeal in the said case. The extent of jurisdiction and fact finding power of the civil court is much wider than the Estate Officer and the Supreme Court did not hold the proceeding initiated by the unauthorised occupant was not maintainable or he had no locus standi. Moreover, it is argued by the petitioner, the writ court does not have jurisdiction or power to usurp the statutory duty of an Estate Officer, as the Supreme Court did as an Appellate Court, going into the rights of the parties to the proceeding. That apart, it is argued, the assignment of the lease was obtained in the said case asfter the lease in favour of the assignor had expired by efflux of time and therefore the assi