The main legal point established in the judgment is the discretion of the court to direct the petitioner to furnish security on the full arbitral award and the impact of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 on the provisions of Section 36(3) of the Act of 1996.

JUDGMENT

Debangsu Basak, J. - The petitioner has applied under Section 36(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for stay of operation of the award dated June 22, 2020 as modified on August 14, 2020.

2. The respondent has waived its right to use any affidavit dealing with the allegations made in the petition. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents has invited the Court to dispose the application on the basis of the materials made available on record.

3. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent has referred to the provisions of Section 36(3) of the Act of 1996 and Order 41 Rule 5(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. He has contended that, the Court has no discretion but to direct the petitioner to furnish security on the full arbitral award. He has submitted that, the Court however has a discretion so far as the quality of the security that may be directed to be furnished in the sense that, the Court may direct furnishing security by cash or by any other means. However, according to him, the entirety of the awarded amount should be directed to be secured. In support of such contentions, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent has relied upon the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, (Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited v. Candor Gurgaon Two Developers and Projects Pvt. Ltd.,2018 SCCOnlineCal 10225), an order dated September 14, 2018 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited v. Candor Gurgaon Two Developers and Projects Pvt. Ltd. , order dated July 16, 2018 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manish v. Godawari Marathawada Irrigation Development Corporation and (State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Dilip Kumar Chatterjee,2020 SCCOnlineCal 1666).

4. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that, the petitioner has a right of withdrawal of the amount directed to be secured. In support of such contentions, he has relied upon (M/s. Mehta Teja Singh and Company v. Grindlays Bank Limited,1982 2 SCC 199) and ( Kanpur Jal Sansthan & Anr. v. Bapu Constructions, (2015) 5 SCC 267) .

5. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent has relied upon a list of dates in support of his contentions. He has submitted that, the respondent is entitled to the entire awarded amount. The respondent should be permitted to withdraw the cash security that the petitioner may deposit, upon the respondent furnishing requisite security thereof.

6. Learned Junior Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that, the Court has sufficient power and discretion under Section 36 of the Act of 1996 to require such amount of security or deposit as the Court deems appropriate to stay the execution of an award pending consideration of an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. In support of such contention, he has relied upon ( Pam Developments Private Limited v. State of West Bengal, (2019) 8 SCC 112) . He has submitted that, the petitioner herein is a statutory authority established under the provisions of the West Bengal Town and Country Planning and Development) Act, 1979. The Court should exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner. According to him, all the authorities cited by the respondent on account of exercise of discretion are at the stage of Section 37 of the Act of 1996 when, the Courts have already filtered the award once. Such is not the case herein. The Court is yet to decide on the merits of the award.

7. The respondent had invited bids for development of residential complex-cum-office complex at two separate sites in East Kolkata Area through joint venture with the petitioner on December 18, 2006. A prebid meeting had been held between the parties on January 4, 2007. The parties had entered into a memorandum of understanding of joint venture on December 17, 2007. On December 7, 2010, the Government had cancelled the lease granted in favour of the petitioner. On April 19, 2018, the State