The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the limitation period for execution of a decree, the distinction between original claims and execution of decrees, and the obligation of the judgment-debtor to comply with the court's order.

JUDGMENT

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. - The petitioner is a private limited company engaged in the work of civil construction. Pursuant to a tender issued by the respondents for widening and strengthening of the Calcutta - Basanti Road, the petitioner executed some work. Subsequently, the petitioner raised an escalation bill for an amount of Rs.52,57,672.47 p, out of which Rs.18,16,484/- was paid by the respondents. However, by a letter dated May 17, 2004, the respondents demanded refund of such payment, since, according to the respondents, no escalation charge was payable. The petitioner refused to refund such amount. The sum was deducted from the bills relating to other contracts between the same parties and the amount of Rs.18,16,484/- was realized from the respondents with regard to the work of a bridge over the river 'Hogol' at Sonakhali, also performed by the petitioner.

2. Being thus aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a writ petition bearing W.P. No. 212 of 2008 in the Original Side of this court and, vide Order dated March 17, 2009, a co-ordinate Bench of this court disposed of the same, setting aside the demand contained in the respondents' letter dated May 17, 2004 and directing the State to pay the entire amount of the escalation bill to the petitioner, save to the extent that the State could contest the veracity of. The learned Single Judge further directed that the payment should be released by the State to the petitioner with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from May 17, 2004 till payment.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, although the principal amount as directed was paid by the respondents, no interest was paid on the same, in violation of the order of the co-ordinate Bench. Several communications were made in that regard, but to no effect.

4. Learned counsel refers, in such context, to the notices issued by the petitioner on January 17, 2011, August 14, 2013 and June 24, 2014, all annexed to the writ petition.

5. Learned counsel argues that the present writ petition is in the nature of an application for execution of the order dated March 17, 2009 passed in W.P. No. 212 of 2008. By referring to Article 136 of the Limitation Act, it is argued that the limitation period for levying execution in respect of a money decree is 12 years. As such, the present claim is not time-barred.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner cites Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M.R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay and others, (1967) AIR SC 1450 , wherein the Supreme Court laid down the principle that the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, it was held, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, the delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of the defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.

7. Learned counsel submits that, in the present case, no adverse effect can be suffered by the respondents, since the right of the petitioner to get interest was already crystallized by the Order dated March 17, 2009 passed in W.P. No. 212 of 2008. The petitioner never waived the right; on the contrary, wrote several letters