The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of Section 10, Civil P.C. to determine the parallel nature of suits and the appropriateness of a stay, as well as the consideration of an interim injunction to restrain a party from proceeding further with a suit.

JUDGMENT

Costello, J. - These two appeals arise out of a judgment delivered by Buckland, J., on 19th December 1933. As a result of that judgment, two orders were made. The suit in which these orders were made was Suit No. 2151 of 1933, and it was a suit brought by Kantichandra Mukerji, the Official Receiver, as the receiver appointed in Suit No. 1395 of 1933. The defendants were six persons, namely, Durgaprasad, Gangadhar and Satnarayan-all three residing at Kucha Chelan at Delhi, and described as traders and landholders, and Satnarayan Dalmia, Deokinandan Dalmia and Sedmull Dalmia-all residing at and carrying on business at No. 133, Cotton Street, in Calcutta and they were described as landholders.

2. In order to appreciate how this suit came into existence, it is necessary to say something about the relationship of these six persons and the history of the litigation which had taken place between them. The first three defendants carried on business, in Delhi, as a firm, described as Parasram Harnandroy, and the other three defendants carried on business in Calcutta, as a firm under the name and style of Hargobindroy Mathuradas and all these six persons carried on business in partnership, under the name and style of Harnandroy Badridas. In the month of March 1933, a suit was instituted, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Delhi, being Suit No. 52 of 1933, in which the plaintiff was Durgaprasad and that suit was for dissolution of the partnership carried on in the name of Harnandroy Badridas. As a counterblast to that, a suit was instituted in this Court, being Suit No. 747 of 1933, on 4th April 1933, by the partners of the Calcutta firm, who have been described in the proceedings as the Dalmias. This suit was brought by Satnarayan-one of the Dalmias against the partners in the Calcutta firm and by the partners in the Delhi firm for dissolution of the larger partnership. We are not really concerned with those two suits, because in June 1933, there was a compromise arrived at, whereby that litigation was terminated. Both the suits were compromised by an agreement, made on 1st June 1933, and there was some subsequent arrangement on 5th June 1933. The compromise was recorded in the Delhi suit, that is to say, in Suit No. 52 of 1933, and as a part of the settlement, the Calcutta suit was withdrawn. It is of some importance to see what were the terms of that compromise. So far as they are material they appear in sub-paragraphs of para. 4 of the petition, which was put forward before the Court at Delhi, upon which the compromise was recorded and sub-paras. (a) and (b) are in these terms:

(a) That R.B.L. Sedmull will produce all the account books, papers and records of the period of partnership for the purposes of said accounting which may afterwards be delivered to such person as may be directed to receive by Seth Satnarayan of the first party. His decision will be binding on all the parties,

and

(b) That accounts of the partnership shall be taken and R.B.L. Sedmull will render all the accounts, etc., etc.

3. Those two matters were consequential upon the main term of the compromise, which was that the partnership business hitherto carried on at No. 69, Cotton Street, under the management of the second party, should stand dissolved, as from 24th March 1933, and the parties agreed to divide the assets and the liabilities of the partnership on the terms set out in the same sub-paragraph. On 29th June 1933, another suit was started, in Calcutta, in which Satnarayan was the plaintiff and the defendants were Sedmull and Deokinandan. That suit was, in a sense, of a domestic character, because it was merely for dissolution of the partnership existing between those persons. The importance of it is that in that suit there was an application for the appointment of a receiver and an order was made, by consent, in which a receiver was appointed of the joint properties of the parties, and what those properties consisted of was set forth in the do