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1945 Supreme(Cal) 97

CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Mt. Ayesha Bibi - Appellant
Versus
Subodh Ch. Chakravarty - Respondent
Suit No. 319 of 1944
Decided On : 02-03-1945

Headnote:

Declaration - Dissolution of Marriage - Specific Relief Act, 1877, Section 42 - The court held that a Hindu wife who converts to Islam is entitled to a declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, that her marriage has been dissolved. The court reasoned that the personal law applicable to a person in India depends on their religious system, not their geographical domicile. The court further held that the rights and obligations of parties relating to dissolution of marriage are governed by the personal law of the parties at the time of the institution of the suit, not at the time of the marriage. The court also considered the implications of the conversion on the husband's rights and obligations under Hindu law and found that he was left with none of the ordinary legal incidents or rights of marriage. The court concluded that the absence of a legal direction for dissolution of the marriage under Hindu law did not prevent the court from declaring the marriage dissolved, as the husband was in no better position than if the marriage had been effectively and legally fully dissolved.

Fact of the Case:

A Hindu woman married a Hindu man according to Hindu rites. After facing cruelty and lack of support from her husband and his family, she converted to Islam. The husband remained a Hindu and refused to embrace Islam. The wife filed a suit for a declaration that her marriage had been dissolved under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the wife's conversion to Islam was effective and bona fide. The court held that the personal law applicable to a person in India depends on their religious system, not their geographical domicile. The court further held that the rights and obligations of parties relating to dissolution of marriage are governed by the personal law of the parties at the time of the institution of the suit, not at the time of the marriage. The court also considered the implications of the conversion on the husband's rights and obligations under Hindu law and found that he was left with none of the ordinary legal incidents or rights of marriage. The court concluded that the absence of a legal direction for dissolution of the marriage under Hindu law did not prevent the court from declaring the marriage dissolved, as the husband was in no better position than if the marriage had been effectively and legally fully dissolved.

Issues: The main issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to grant a declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, that the marriage between the plaintiff (Hindu wife who converted to Islam) and the defendant (Hindu husband) had been dissolved. The court also considered the question of what law should be applied in such a case, whether Hindu law, Mahomedan law, or a combination of both.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the personal law applicable to a person in India depends on their religious system, not their geographical domicile. The court further held that the rights and obligations of parties relating to dissolution of marriage are governed by the personal law of the parties at the time of the institution of the suit, not at the time of the marriage. The court also considered the implications of the conversion on the husband's rights and obligations under Hindu law and found that he was left with none of the ordinary legal incidents or rights of marriage. The court concluded that the absence of a legal direction for dissolution of the marriage under Hindu law did not prevent the court from declaring the marriage dissolved, as the husband was in no better position than if the marriage had been effectively and legally fully dissolved.

Final Decision: The court granted the plaintiff's prayer for a declaration that her marriage had been dissolved under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.

JUDGMENT

Ormond, J. - This is a suit filed on the original side of this High Court by the plaintiff claiming a declaration under S. 42, Specific Relief Act, Act IX [9] of 1877, that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant has been dissolved and that the plaintiff is not the wife of the defendant. It is an undefended suit in which the facts are simple and in a small compass, but it raises complicated questions of law, the decision of which is of far-reaching importance. Amongst these are general questions, to what extent this High Court is bound to, or entitled to, administer the personal law of the parties in a suit, where there is a question relating to marriage; and on what principles; also special questions relating to both Hindu and Mahomedan law. I therefore thought it proper that, in addition to the argument of counsel for the plaintiff, the Court should have also the assistance of counsel as an amicus curiae; and on my invitation the Advocate-General, Mr. S.M. Bose, was good enough to appear as an amicus curiae. Then at a later date when the Advocate-General was away from Calcutta, when final argument on certain further points in respect of Hindu law had arisen from the argument of Mr. S. Chowdhury for the plaintiff, I invited Mr. S.B. Sinha, a well-known advocate of this Court who has had considerable experience in matters of Hindu law, to appear and address me further as an amicus curiae in the matters of Hindu law involved; and he was good enough to accede to my request. I have to thank the Advocate-General and Mr. S.B. Sinha for the trouble they have gone to for the purpose of assisting the Court, I should also add that Mr. S. Chowdhury appearing for the plaintiff has been at great pains to go through the whole matter very carefully and assist me in every possible way.

2. The plaintiff and the defendant were legally married according to Hindu rites at Krishnagar in the district of Nadia in Bengal on 31st July 1941. Both parties were then Hindu Brahmins.

3. The plaintiff is the only child of an educated and cultured Brahmin gentleman who was previously Manager in the office of the Court of Wards. He for some time lived at Krishnagar. He is the nephew of a well known Bengali author, the late Mr. D.L. Roy. The defendant, who has not appeared, is another Hindu Brahmin who lived at a village in Joyrampur in the same district; and was selected by the plaintiff's father to be her husband. Both plaintiff and the defendant had lived there all their lives; as their parents had before them. The petitioner has said in evidence, that she has no intention of living anywhere outside British India; and has spoken also as to the defendant's domicile. It is clear without any room for any suggestion of doubt that both parties were at the time of their marriage and at the time of the institution of the suit, and in fact have been all their lives, and are still, of Indian domicile. There is no question involved in this case with regard to the parties, or either of them, of any foreign domicile or any domicile other than India or any change from their Indian domicile. I have emphasised this point because there seems to be a vital difference between this case and for example the case of Noor Jehan v. Eugene Tiscenko, 45 C.W.N. 1047 at p. 1052 : (A.I.R. (28) 1941 Cal. 582) as to jurisdiction.

4. The plaintiff was apparently little more than 15 years of age at the time of her marriage. Though her own evidence as to age would make her rather younger than that, her father whose evidence I accept, has stated that she was over 18 years of age on 12th September 1944; which would make her about 15 years of age at the time of her marriage.

5. At the time of the marriage the defendant was unemployed. The plaintiff's father got him employment in the Krishnagar Electric Supply Co. at Krishnagar. The defendant did not after the marriage seek to establish a household of his own. Nor did he take the plaintiff to live with his own family. But he

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