JUDGMENT

Sir Richard Couch, Kt., C.J. - The two questions which have been raised in this case appear to me to be substantially the same; because unless the signature which was put on the 17th May to the document was a sufficient signature to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the plaintiffs cannot recover; and the ground upon which the Advocate-General rests his case is that the agreement which the parties came to on the 5th June, was not complete, because there was something further to be done in the shape of signing. The real question is, whether the parties, on the 5th of June, intended that the signature which was put on the 17th May, should be treated as a signature to the agreement as it had been altered by them; because, unless they did so intend, there would be no binding writing signed by the party to be charged which would satisfy the Statute of Frauds. We have been referred by the learned Counsel for the appellants to the case of Durrell v. Evans 1 H. & C., 174, on which he appears considerably to rely. Now the language of Mr. Justice Blackburn in that case shows what is the real question. Mr. Justice Blackburn says in more than one passage of his judgment, that what is neces