JUDGMENT

Sir Barnes Peacock, Kt., C.J. - Looking at this case from beginning to end, I should scarcely have thought it possible that there could be such a casein existence. It appears that Gurudas Roy, the respondent in this appeal, purchased two Government revenue-paying estates from Brahmamayi Devi and Ramjaya Samadar. Upon seeking to obtain possession, the property was found to be in the possession of Mr. Bell, the appellant in this case, who claimed under a putnee-grant from the same vendors, upon which an Act IV of 1840 case was instituted, and it was ordered that Mr. Bell should be retained in possession. Thereupon Gurudas Roy instituted a civil suit to recover back his purchase-money, and also certain revenue which he had paid to Government in respect of the estates. Mr. Bell though ha appears to have had nothing at all to do with the sale to Gurudas, or the receipt of the purchase-money from him, was made a co-defendant. No reason was given in the plaint for making Mr. Bell a party. The plaintiff did not even suggest that he had a right of action Against him, but in his plaint simply prayed a, refund from the Devi and the Samadar, defendants, of his purchase-money; and of the revenue which he had paid. No relief whatever was asked against Mr. Bell. The suit was originally tried before the Principal Sudder Ameen, and was dismissed. On appeal to the Additional Judge of Zillah Dacca, he ordered the decree to be reversed, and the appeal decreed with costs." Nothing further was said in the decree. There was no award that any body should recover any thing from any body else. What then was the effect of reversing the decree of dismissal of the suit, without decreeing any thing against any one? Especially, what was the effect of reversing the decree of dismissal as regards Mr. Bell, from whom no relief was sought? Did it amount to an affirmative decree that the plaintiff should recover from him the purchase-money and the Government revenue which he had paid?

2. In execution of the decreed the Additional Zillah Judge, Mr. Bell's property was seized and sold, upon which he petitioned the Principal Sudder Ameen, and contended that he was not liable under the decree, and that his property ought act to have been seized and sold under it. The Principal Sadder Ameen held, as it appears to me vary properly, that Mr. Bell was not liable to refund the purchase-Money or the Government revenue; but he added that Mr. Bell was so pay the costs of the suit, "inasmuch as he appeared by vakeel in an Appellate Court where the plaintiff, the decree-holder, was the successful suitor." I am at a loss to understand why a gentleman, who is held not liable for the debt, should be liable for the costs of the suit because he appeared by a vakeel. Mr. Bell appealed to the Judge upon the ground that he was not liable to the costs, but the Judge held that he was liable for the costs, and that his property was liable to be sold for them. We have not (sic) any thing to do with the question of costs, inasmuch as that decision of the Judge is the subject of a separate appeal, and is not now before us. Gurudas also appealed from the same decision of the Principal Sadder Ameen, upon the ground that the Principal Sudder Ameen had held, that Mr. Bell was not liable for the purchase-money, and Mr. Abercrombie, the Judge of Dacca, held that Mr. Bell was liable for the purchase-money, and that his property was liable to he said in execution for it. He says, " Mr. Bell is not liable for the costs only according to the terms of the decree. He is jointly liable with any other defendant for the whole decree, and the Principal Sudder Ameen has no authority, in execution, to release Mr. Bell from any part of his liability." He reversed the decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen so far as it released Mr. Bell from liability for the purchase-money and the Government revenue paid by the plaintiff, and held that his property was liable to be sold in execution for it.

3. It appea