JUDGMENT

Sir Richard Couch, Kt., C.J. - A preliminary objection was taken to the hearing of the appeal, on the ground that the order for the issuing of the mandamus was not a "judgment" within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent of 1865, and was therefore not open to appeal. We think that this objection is well-founded. Clause 15 provides that an appeal to the High Court shall lie "from the judgment (not being a sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial) of one Judge of the said High Court." But the order of the learned Judge that the mandamus should issue is not a judgment. The mandamus which will be issued under it will not be a peremptory one, but merely to do certain things, or to show cause to the contrary; so that the order of the learned Judge does not determine any question whatever between the parties; it only initiates the proceedings by which the liability of the Justices to make compensation will be ascertained and determined. It was contended for the Justices, in support of the right of appeal, that the word "judgment" in clause 15 included any order affecting the interests of the parties, as was shown by the special limitation to a judgment "not