JUDGMENT

Sir Barnes Peacock, Kt., C.J. - There are, in my opinion, several important distinctions between murder and culpable homicide; an offence cannot amount to murder, unless it falls within the definition of culpable homicide, for s. 300 merely points out the cases in which "culpable homicide is murder." But an offence may amount to culpable homicide without amounting to murder. Culpable homicide is not murder, if the case falls within any of the exceptions mentioned in s. 300. The causing of death by doing an act with the intention of causing death is culpable homicide. It is also murder, unless the case falls within one of the exceptions in s. 300. Causing death with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person if the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, in my opinion, falls within the words of s. 299-- "with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death," and is culpable homicide. It is also murder, unless the case falls within one of the exceptions; see s. 300, cl. 3. Causing death by doing an act with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death is culpable homicide, but it is not murder, even if it does not fall within any of the exceptions mentioned in s. 300, unless it falls within cls. 2, 3 or 4 of s. 300; that is to say, unless the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, or unless the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In speaking of acts, I of course include illegal omissions. There are many cases falling within the words of s. 299-- "or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death" that do not fall within the 2nd, 3rd or 4th clauses of s. 300, such for instance, as the offences described in ss. 279, 280, 281, 282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, and 289, if the offender knows that his act or illegal omission is likely to cause death, and if in fact it does cause death. But although he may know that the act or illegal omission is so dangerous that it is likely to cause death, it is not murder, even if death is caused thereby, unless the offender knows that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or unless he intends thereby to cause death or such bodily injury as is described in cl. 2 or 3 of s. 300. As an illustration; suppose a gentleman should drive a buggy in a rash and negligent manner, or furiously along a narrow crowded street. He might know that he was likely to kill some person, but he might not intend to kill any one, or to cause bodily injury to any one. In such a case, if he should cause death, I apprehend, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, unless it should be found, as a fact, that he knew that his act was so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury, &c. as to bring the case within the 4th clause of s. 300. In an ordinary case of furious driving, the facts would scarcely warrant such a finding. If found guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the offender might be punished to the extent of transportation for life or imprisonment for ten years, with fine (see ss. 304 and 59); or if a European or American, he would be subject to penal servitude, instead of transportation. It would not be right in such a case that the offender should be liable to capital punishment for murder. The first part of s. 304 would not apply to the case. That applies only to cases which would be murder, if not falling within