The main legal point established in the judgment is that the withdrawal of an application made under Section 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not nullify its effect, and the subject matter of such an application remains within the purview of Section 109, barring the Civil Court from entertaining a suit concerning the same matter.

JUDGMENT

B.B. Ghose, J. - These appeals arise out of as many suits for rent at an enhanced rate on several grounds stated in the plaints. The Munsif made a partial decree in favour of the landlord, the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendants, the Subordinate Judge has dismissed the claim for enhancement on the ground that the suit for enhancement is not maintainable under the provisions of Section 109 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the landlord having made applications u/s 105 of the Act before the Revenue Officer, on the authority of the case of Abeda Khatun v. Majubali Chowdhury 59 Ind. Cas. 760 : 48 C. 157 : 24 C.W.N. 1020 : 33 C.L.J. 304. The learned Vakil for the appellant argues before us that there is a difference of opinion with regard to the construction of Section 109, and contends that the case of Abed a Khatun v. Majubali chowdhury 59 Ind. Cas. 760 : 48 C. 157 : 24 C.W.N. 1020 : 33 C.L.J. 304 is distinguishable from the present case and that the other cases relied on by him support his contention that such a suit is maintainable, notwithstanding the provisions of; Section 109 of the Bengal Tenancy Act V Before deciding the question, it stem? to me that it is necessary to look into the provisions of Section 109 of the Act in order to see whether the present suit for enhancement is maintainable. What happened in this case was, that the plaintiff presented an application u/s 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act before the Revenue Officer with regard to a number of (sic), on the 18th of September 1917, he presented a petition before the Revenue Officer to the effect that certain of the tenants whose holdings had been recorded in a number of khaliat is had compromised the suit but certain other tenants among whom are the present defendants did not appear for the purpose of coming to a compromise, and he prayed that permission might be granted to him to bring suits in the Civil Court against the defendants who had not compromised and that the case might be disposed of according to the compromise entered into by the others. On this petition, the Revenue Officer made this order; "Plaintiff files a petition for permission to withdraw cases against the defendants of khatiand Nos. 172, 196 etc., The prayer is allowed. Other defendants have compromised. Put up on 27th September 1917 for judgment." In the judgment, nothing further is said with regard to those defendants who did not compromise. Now, section of the Bengal Tenancy Act runs thus: " Subject to the provisions of Section 109A, a Civil Court shall not entertain any application or suit concerning any matter which is or has already been the subject of an application made, suit instituted or proceedings taken under Sections 105 to 108 (both inclusive)". There cannot be any doubt that this matter, which is now for decision in the Civil Court, was a matter which was the subject of an application made u/s 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The contention is that, when the application u/s 105 was withdrawn against these defendants, the operation of Section 109 cannot come into play or, in other words, the contention is that, unless there has been a decision on the application by the Revenue Authority it is open to the party who made the application to bring a suit in the Civil Court with regard to the same subject-matter. It seems tome that to accept such a contention would be to make an addition to the section and to read the words " subject of an application made" as if they stand for "subject of a decision", which, in my judgment, we cannot do. Therefore, apart front authorities, it would seem that the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge is right as regards the true construction of Section 109 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It is contended, however, by the learned Vakil for the appellant that a number, of cases have been decided the other way and that this matter should be referred for decision to a Full Bench. The cases to which he refers are these Chiodilh v. Tulsi Singh 18 Ind. Cas. 1