The main legal point established in the judgment is that even if an action is authorized by a contract, forceful entry and commission of other crimes during the execution of that action are not permissible under the law.

1. The present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short `the Code') is for quashment of Criminal Complaint Case No.38/2003 pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ramanujganj.

2. Quashment is prayed on the ground that if the allegation made in the complaint is admitted in its face value, even then conviction of the petitioner under Sections 392, 394 & 506 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. would not be possible on the ground that the petitioner has took out the vehicle in question in compliance of the agreement executed between the parties.

3. Brief facts leading to filing of this petition are that respondent No.1 has purchased one bus under hire purchase agreement and the amount was financed by Shriram Transport Finance Co. Ltd. (for short `the Finance Company'). The petitioner is administrator of the Finance Company. Respondent No.1 has paid the amount of loan. On 15-12-2002 at about 4-5 p.m. the bus was standing in a work shop at Ambikapur. The petitioner along with other persons came to the said work shop and forcefully tried to snatch the key of the bus from the conductor of the bus, they used filthy language and threatened the bus conductor & respondent No.1 also, and after snatching the key of the bus they took out the bus forcefully. Respondent No.1 made a complaint to the Police and finally, filed complaint before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ramanujganj who made enquiry in terms of Chapter XV of the Code and registered criminal complaint case against the petitioner.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the Court below.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is Director of the Finance Company and the bus was purchased under hire purchase agreement. The bus was hypothecated to the Finance Company and before payment of all installments & dues, the Finance Company was owner of the bus and it has a right to take possession in terms of the agreement. Clause 7 of the agreement authorizes the Finance Company to obtain re-possession of the vehicle after entering into the building, premises or place or site, where the vehicle was kept. Therefore the petitioner has not committed any offence and has acted under the agreement executed between both the parties. Learned counsel placed reliance in the matter of Trilok Singh and others v. Satya Deo Tripathi1 in which it has been held by the Apex Court that launching of criminal prosecution by purchaser against financer - Dispute raised was purely of civil nature and criminal proceeding would be an abuse of the process of the Court. Learned counsel further placed reliance in the matter of Charanjit Singh Chadha and others v. Sudhir Mehra2 in which it has been held by the Apex Court that if hire purchase agreement provides the clause that financer was entitled to repossess the vehicle in case of default, repossession of vehicle would not amount to any offence and criminal proceeding on the basis of such repossession would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. Learned counsel also placed reliance in the matter of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and another v. State of Maharashtra and another3 in which the Apex Court has held that law declared by the same Bench or larger Bench has a binding force and in case of any deviation, the subsequent Bench is required to refer the matter before larger Bench. Learned counsel further submits that the decision rendered in the matter of ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Prakash Kaur and others4 is judgment per incurian therefore, same is not binding or having force of law declared by the Apex Court.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1 vehemently argued that in the present case, respondent No.1 has paid all installments & dues to the Finance Company, the Finance Company that is to say, the petitioner & others, have not only, simply, took out the bus from the premises of respondent No.1, but they have e