2007(3) C.G.L.J. 499
HIGH COURT OF CHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Hon'ble Shri Dilip Raosaheb Deshmukh J
Divisional Forest Officer Territorial ...Petitioners
VERSUS
Fagua Sai ...Respondents
MA No.366 Of 1988
Decided on : 07/08/2007
Workmen's Compensation - Liability of Employer - Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, Section 3(1), Privy Council decision in Margaret Brooker vs. Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia), Ltd., and Supreme Court decision in State of Rajasthan vs. Ram Prasad and another - Lightning strike causing death of workman - Causal connection with employment and liability of employer
Fact of the Case:
The appeal was against an order awarding compensation for the death of a workman due to a lightning strike. The employer contested liability, arguing that the lightning strike did not arise out of the employment.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the nature of the work exposed the deceased to the hazard of lightning, establishing a causal connection with the employment and holding the employer liable for compensation.
Issues: The main issue was whether the lightning strike causing the workman's death had a causal connection with the employment, thus establishing the employer's liability for compensation.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, Section 3(1), and interpreted the principles laid down by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court in similar cases involving natural forces causing injury to workmen. It emphasized the need to establish a causal connection between the accident and the employment to succeed in a claim for compensation.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the court upheld the order awarding compensation to the claimants, acknowledging the causal connection between the lightning strike and the deceased workman's employment.
1. Heard.
2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 21-07-1988 passed by the Court of Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Labour Court, Bilaspur, M.P. (hereinafter referred to as the lower Court) in case No.99-WC-Fatal/85 awarding compensation of Rs.27,165-60 along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of accident till deposit.
3. Brief facts are as under:
The applicant Fagua Sai being the father of the deceased Dhaneshwar Sai filed an application before the lower Court for compensation. Pleading in para-1 of the application is as under:-
4. The appellant/non-applicant submitted the following reply to para-1 is as under:-
5. Recording that there was no dispute on facts, the lower Court framed the sole question of law as under:-
6. Taking into consideration the admitted fact that the deceased was under employment under the appellant herein, the lower Court placing reliance on a decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1933 PC 225 held that where a workman while being under employment dies due to vis major i.e. a natural calamity like lightning, the employer is liable to pay compensation.
7. Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in order to succeed in a claim for compensation in case of death resulting from injury, it has to be established that personal injury resulting in death was caused to the workmen by accident arising out of and also in the course of his employment . No material was placed by the claimant/non-applicant to show that the act of lightning was an act which arose out of the employment, and therefore, the appellant was not liable to pay compensation. No other point was urged in this appeal by learned counsel for the appellant.
8. Having considered the submission of Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant, I have perused the record. Section 3 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 reads as under:
"3. Employer's liability for compensation- (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, (underlined by me)his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:
It is thus clear that in order to succeed in a claim for compensation in case of death resulting from the injury, the applicant has to prove that not only the accident arose out of his employment but was also in the course of his employment.
9. Lightening is an act of god i.e. vis major. In Divisional Controller, KSRTC vs. Mahadeva Shetty and another (2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 197, the Apex Court described an act of God as under:-
"The expression "act of God" signifies the operation of natural forces free from human intervention, such as lightning, storm etc. It may include such unexpected occurrences of nature as severe gale, snowstorms, hurricanes, cyclones, tidal waves and the like. But every unexpected wind and storm does not operate as an excuse from liability, if there is a reasonable possibility of anticipating their happening. An act of God provides no excuse unless it is so unexpected that no reasonable human foresight could be presumed to anticipate the occurrence, having regard to the conditions of time and place known to be prevailing. For instance, where by experience of a number of years, preventive action can be taken, Lord Westbury defined the act of God (damnum fatale in Scotch Laws) as an occurrence which no human foresight can provide against and of which human prudence is not bound to recognize the possibility. This appears to be the nearest approach to the true meaning of an act of God. Lord Blancaburgh spoke of it as "an irresistible and unsearchable providence nullifying our human effort".
10. In Margaret Brooker vs. Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia), Ltd. A.I.R. 1933 Privy Council 225, the standard of proof required to establish liability of the employer to compensate in a case of injury by natural force i.e. lightning their Lordships of the privy council observ
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