The main legal point established was the interpretation and application of Sections 12 (1) (g) & (h) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and the requirement to prove the grounds for eviction based on the evidence presented.

T.P. Sharma, J.

1. By this appeal under of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'the Code'), the Appellant has challenged legality & propriety of the judgment & decree dated 23-10-92 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Raipur in Civil Appeal No. 58A/91 allowing the civil suit by reversing the judgment & decree of dismissal of suit, dated 1-8-88 passed by the 7th Civil Judge Class-II. Raipur in Civil Suit No. 98A/86. The lower appellate Court has decreed the suit under Sections 12 (1) (g) & (h) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act').

2. This appeal is admitted for hearing on the following substantial question of law:

Whether the ground Under Section 12(1)(h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is made out, taking into consideration the effect of Section 12(7) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.

3. Original Respondent Shiv Shankar Sharma (since deceased) has filed cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 read with Rule 33 of the Code and I.A. No. 3464/1993 for taking additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code.

4. As per pleadings of the parties, original Respondent/Plaintiff Shiv Shankar Sharma (since deceased), landlord of the suit premises, filed suit for eviction and recovery of rent against the Appellant herein on the ground of bona fide need for non-residential purpose and reconstruction of suit accommodation. By filing written statement, the Appellant herein has denied the allegations made in the plaint relating to bona fide need and need of accommodation for reconstruction. After affording opportunity of hearing to the parties, learned Civil Judge Class-II has dismissed the civil suit for eviction, same was challenged in appeal before the lower appellate Court and the lower appellate Court by allowing the civil appeal has decreed the suit under Sections 12 (1) (g) & (h) of the Act and directed the Appellant herein under Section 18 of the Act for handing over the possession of tenanted accommodation after such reconstruction.

5. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties, perused judgment & decree of both the Courts below and records of both the Courts below.

6. At the out set, learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that in the present case, the sole Respondent/landlord has died and the Appellant has impleaded his legal representatives as Respondents, but the Respondents have not amended their cross-objection suitably and have not brought the legal representatives of the deceased sole Respondent on record within the stipulated time and, therefore, the cross-objection filed on behalf of the Respondent, virtually deceased Shiv Shankar Sharma, abates and is liable to be dismissed as abated. Learned Counsel further argued that on the basis of cross-objection no substantial question of law has been formulated and, therefore, even otherwise, the Respondents are not entitled to challenge the judgment & decree on the basis of cross-objection. Learned Counsel also argued that in the present case, without any evidence the lower appellate Court has decreed the suit in favour of the Respondents. The Respondents have not proved budget estimate and eviction of suit premises on the ground of reconstruction. Without such proof the lower appellate Court was not competent to decree the suit under Sections 12 (1) (g) & (h) of the Act. Learned Counsel placed reliance in the matter of Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh and Anr. (2008) 12 SCC 796 in which the Supreme Court has held that without formulation of substantial question of law the second appeal is not maintainable.

7. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the Respondents have not filed any cross-appeal, they have filed cross-objection in which the Appellant has impleaded the legal representatives of the deceased sole Respondent as party and, therefore, the Respondents are not required to implead themselves as legal representatives of the deceased sole Respondent as party in