The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the exemption notification under Section 3(2) of the Act, 1961, the requirement for specific pleading and issue, and the onus of proof for eviction under Section 12(1)(i) of the Act, 1961.

1. By this Second Appeal, the appellants have challenged the legality & propriety of the judgment and decree dated 15.3.1993 passed by the District Judge, Raigarh, in Civil Appeal No.31A/91, reversing the judgment and decree of dismissal of civil suit by allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit dated 14.3.1991 passed by the Third Class-II, Raigarh, in Civil Suit No.69A/87.

2. The present Second Appeal is admitted for consideration on the following substantial questions of law:(i) Whether the lower appellate Court was right in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court on the ground that the notification published in M.P. Rajpatra dated 7.9.1989 and referred , to in paragraph 8 of the impugned judgment exempted accommodations belonging to the Public Trusts from the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was applicable to the accommodation belonging to the respondent No. 1-trust?

(ii) Whether, the lower appellate Court was right in holding that the aforesaid notification was retrospective in effect and also governed the pending suits and that in such a case even notice under Sec. 106 of T.P. Act was not necessary to be served on the tenant-appellant?

(iii) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in decreeing the suit under Section 12 (1) (i) of the C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 without there being any pleading, issue and evidence?

3. As per pleadings of the parties, on 20.2.1984 suit for eviction was filed by Jama Masjid and Chhoti Masjid Trust, Raigarh through Mohd.Rahrnan against Mukundilal, father of the present appellants under Section 23-A of the C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act, 1961 ') in which it has been pleaded that defendant Mukundilal has constructed his house and the appellant-trust is in need of accommodation for his Imam before the Court of Third Civil Judge Class-II, Raigarh. By filing written statement, defendant Mukundlal, father of the present appellants has denied the adverse allegation made in the plaint and pleaded that he has constructed his own house, but has denied the bonafide need of the landlord. He has further pleaded that in the light of exemption under Section 3 of the Act, 1961, suit filed under the provisions of the Act, 1961 is not maintainable. After providing opportunity of hearing to the parties, learned trial Court has dismissed the suit by holding that exemption granted vide Notification No. ,d 24(4)-83 - xxx II-I dated 7.9.89 was not retrospective, therefore, present appellant-trust is not exempted from filing civil suit under the Act, 1961. Judgment and decree impugned was challenged before the lower appellate Court and by allowing the appeal learned lower appellate Court has held that plaintiff appellant trust therein was entitled to file civil suit for eviction without any ground and also entitled for eviction under Section 12 (1) (i) of the Act, 1961.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the judgment and decree impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court and records of the Courts below.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that exemption granted under Section 3 (2) of the Act, 1961 was applicable to appellant No.1-public trust, therefore, suit was not maintainable under the provisions of the Act, 1961. The plaintiff has not served notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 for termination of tenancy/lease; therefore, in the absence of any such notice, suit for possession without termination of lease was not maintainable.

6. Learned counsel placed reliance in the matter of Abdul Rehman Vs. Mst.Khatun1 in which the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held that the Court cannot proceed on the ground which was not in the plaint.

7. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the judgment and decree impugned and argued that the alleged notification was not applicable to the respondent-trust who has filed the suit in the year 1984 before issuance of such notification, there