2018 Supreme(Chh) 121
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
Ramesh Kumar Gupta, S/o. late Pyare Lal Gupta - Petitioner
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh, Labour Department, through its Principal Secretary, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, Raipur (Chhattisgarh) - Respondent
Writ Petition (C) No. 1777 of 2017
Decided On : 16-01-2018
For the Petitioner:Mr. T. K. Jha and Mr. Romir S. Goyal, Advocates.
For the Respondent:Mr. Arun Sao, Dy. Advocate General.
Headnote:
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 36(4) - Labor Court - By which said court has annulled all his appearances made in various cases on behalf of State Government since holding that he has failed to furnish order of appointment issued by Government/or its officer-in-charge duly appointing him to appear in those proceedings and said order has been passed in exercise of power conferred - writ petitioner would submit that such an order passed by the Labor Court is totally unsustainable and bad in law - He would further submit that no such power is conferred by Section 36(4) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to annul his appearances already made on behalf of his party/client (State Government) as those appearances have become final - He would further submit that the State Government or its officers have not disputed his appearances so made or has not stated that the petitioner was not at all authorized to appear on behalf of Government or its officer or he made appearances without instructions on behalf of the Government as such the order impugned is in excess of its jurisdiction and liable to be set aside – Held, It would appear that call was made by the District Bar Association to boycott proceedings of labour court, for certain grievances as reflected in the impugned order against the Presiding Officer, which was totally unauthorized and illegal in view of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in and petitioner should have shown the courage of defying the call but rather he has joined hands with the unauthorized act of Bar Association and also boycotted the court proceeding before labor court and by joining that petitioner even did not made an attempt to demonstrate stating that he was duly appointed to appear in all those proceedings leading to passing of this order - Writ petition is allowed
1. Petitioner herein is a practicing advocate since 1975. He has also served the Government of Madhya Pradesh and the Government of Chhattisgarh as Panel Lawyer and also represented the Government of Chhattisgarh before the Labour Court. He has challenged legality, validity and correctness of order dated 18.04.2017 passed by the Labour Court by which the said court has annulled all his appearances made in various cases on behalf of the State Government since 2013 holding that he has failed to furnish order of appointment issued by the Government/or its officer-in-charge duly appointing him to appear in those proceedings and said order has been passed in exercise of power conferred under Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Mr. T.K. Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner, would submit that such an order passed by the Labour Court is totally unsustainable and bad in law. He would further submit that no such power is conferred by Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to annul his appearances already made on behalf of his party/client (State Government) as those appearances have become final. He would further submit that the State Government or its officers have not disputed his appearances so made or has not stated that the petitioner was not at all authorized to appear on behalf of the Government or its officer or he made appearances without instructions on behalf of the Government as such the order impugned is in excess of its jurisdiction and liable to be set aside.
3. Mr. Arun Sao, learned Deputy Advocate General, would submit that boycotting the court and abstaining from court proceeding is contrary to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and as such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions and went through the record with utmost circumspection.
5. At the outset, it is appropriate to mention that the impugned order was passed on 18.04.2017 in Case No.224/I.D. Act/2011 Reference, in which the petitioner was a counsel appearing on behalf of the Government, but he has not appeared on that date supporting the boycott call given by the Rajnandgaon Bar Association by memo dated 03.04.2017 striking and boycotting the Labour Court proceeding. I will deal with this issue little later.
6. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which states as under:-
“36. Representation of parties.-
(1) to (3) ***** ***** *****
(4) In any proceeding [before a Labur Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and [with the leave of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be].”
A focused glance of above-stated provision would show that by virtue of above-stated provision, party to proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, can engage a legal practitioner only after fulfillment of conditions like consent of other party and leave of court. Sub-section (4) of Section 36 does not insist upon a written consent. It could be implied. There is no provision in the Act enabling such withdrawal or revocation of consent already granted.
7. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has appeared before the Labour Court in various cases on behalf of the State Government and its authorities since 2013 and leave has been granted by the appropriate court or Tribunal in those cases and there is no dispute raised on behalf of the State Government or its authorities in that behalf. The leave granted has been annulled holding that the petitioner has failed to produce his authority letter duly appointing him as panel lawyer on behalf of the State Government in those cases. Section 36(4) does not empower the courts or tribunals to revoke the leave already granted.
8. Even otherwise, termination of Vakalat of an advocate i