Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

1. In a arbitral proceeding rendered between the appellant and the respondent herein, the award was passed by sole Arbitral Tribunal on 15.7.2010 in favour of the respondent herein at Kolkata and thereafter in order to execute the award, execution was levied by the respondent herein on 11.6.2012 at Bilaspur. During pendency of the execution application, the appellant herein filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter called as "AC Act") for setting aside arbitral award on 27.11.2012 at Principal Civil Court, Bilaspur, in which the respondent appeared and filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called as "CPC") for rejection of said application stating inter-alia that the Principal Civil Court, Bilaspur has no jurisdiction to consider the application under Section 34 of the AC Act. Learned Principal Civil Court, Bilaspur by its impugned award granted that application filed by the respondent under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC and rejected the application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the CPC. Questioning that order, this arbitration appeal has been filed by the appellant herein under Section 37 (1) (b) of the AC Act. Mr. Anoop Mazumdar, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the appellant has already levied execution application under Section 36 of the AC Act before the Principal Civil Court, Bilaspur, therefore, by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 42 of the AC Act, the Principal Civil Court, Bilaspur will have the jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 34 of the AC Act. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the said Court be directed to consider the application of the appellant on merits in accordance with law. He placed strong reliance of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of State of West Bengal and others v. Associated Contractors (2015)1 SCC 32 and State of Maharashtra through Executive Engineer, Road Development Division No. 111, Panvel and another v. Atlanta Limited (2014)11 SCC 619.

2. On the other hand, Mr. Sunil Otwani, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the appellant cannot be allowed to take recourse of Section 42 of the AC Act as Section 42 of the AC Act would not apply in execution application. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matters of Swastik Gases Private Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited (2013) 9 SCC 32, B.E. Simoese Von Starabury Niedenthal and another v. Chhattisgarh Investment Limited (2015) 12 SCC 225, Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited v. Datawind Innovations Private Limited and others (2017) 7 SCC 678 and Sundaram Finance Limited represented by J. Thilak, Senior Manager (Legal) v. Abdul Samad and another (2018) 3 SCC 622.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

4. The short question for consideration would be whether Section 42 of the AC Act would apply to the execution application filed under Section 36 of the AC Act and that will confer the jurisdiction to the Principal Civil Court where execution application under Section 36 of the AC Act is filed and pending consideration.

5. In order to appreciate the point in dispute, it would be appropriate to notice Section 2(e) and 45 of the AC Act which states as under:-

"2. Definitions.-(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a) to (d) xxx xxx xxx

(e) "Court" means-

(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but do