2019 Supreme(Chh) 544
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J.
Dhuru Manjhi - Appellant
Vs.
Kanhairam - Respondent
Second Appeal No. 270 of 2004
Decided on : 21-01-2019
Subject
Civil Law - Additional Evidence in Appellate Court
Act Referred
Headnote
Civil Procedure Code,1908 - Section 96 - Order 41 - Rule 27 - Suit land - Sale deed - Possession - Evidence - Permanent injunction - Suit land by registered sale deed dated and came into possession of suit land - That suit was dismissed by trial Court holding that original sale deed dated has not been produced and proved by the plaintiff in accordance with law - Plaintiff preferred first appeal before First Appellate Court under Section 96 of CPC and also filed an application - First Appellate Court by impugned order itself firstly allowed application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC and taken sale deed dated on record and proceeded further to consider appeal on merits and taking into account original sale deed - Learned counsel for appellants/defendants No.1 and 3, would submit that First Appellate Court firstly granted application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC and after taking into account the sale deed dated on record considered that sale deed and granted decree in favour of plaintiff without giving an opportunity to rebut it on principle of natural justice, therefore, it is liable to be set aside – Held, present case and following the principle of law laid down by Supreme Court in above-stated judgments in instant case also after taking and admitting additional document on record i.e. sale deed dated First Appellate Court did not give an opportunity to appellants/defendants to lead evidence in rebuttal and proceeded to decide first appeal finally and ultimately allowed appeal, which is impermissible in law - First Appellate Court ought to have allowed and granted time to appellants/defendants to file/lead evidence in rebuttal - Impugned judgment and decree passed by First Appellate Court is hereby set aside -Matter is remitted to First Appellate Court for deciding appeal afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to present appellants to lead evidence in rebuttal - First Appellate Court shall decide the appeal within four months from today as first appeal was preferred in year- However, it is made clear that this Court has not expressed in opinion on merits of case and it is for First Appellate Court to hear and decide appeal on merits and take a decision in accordance with law - Second appeal is allowed
Advocate Appeared:
A.K. Prasad, Adv., T.R. Chandrakar, Adv., Vimlesh Bajpai, Adv.
SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J.
1. The substantial question of law involved, formulated and to be answered in the second appeal preferred by defendants No.1 and 3 is as under:-
“Whether the lower Appellate Court was legally correct in deciding the appeal on the basis of a document being the original sale deed which was admitted in evidence at the Appellate stage after allowing an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC without giving an opportunity to file the document in rebuttal of the evidence?”
[For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown and ranking given in the suit before the trial Court].
2. The plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction stating inter-alia that he has purchased the suit land by registered sale deed dated 11.2.97 and came into possession of the suit land. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court holding that original sale deed dated 11.2.97 has not been produced and proved by the plaintiff in accordance with law. The plaintiff preferred first appeal before the First Appellate Court under Section 96 of the CPC and also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. The First Appellate Court by the impugned order itself firstly allowed the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC and taken the sale deed dated 11.2.97 on record and proceeded further to consider the appeal on merits and taking into account the original sale deed dated 11.2.97 first appeal has been allowed. Against which, this second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC has been filed by the appellants/defendants No.1 and 3, in which substantial question of law has been framed by this Court, which has been set-out in the opening paragraph of this judgment.
3. Mr.A.K.Prasad, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants No.1 and 3, would submit that the First Appellate Court firstly granted the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC and after taking into account the sale deed dated 11.2.97 on record, considered that sale deed and granted the decree in favour of the plaintiff without giving an opportunity to rebut it on the principle of natural justice, therefore, it is liable to be set aside.
4. Mr.T.R.Chandrakar, learned counsel for respondent No.1/plaintiff, would support the impugned judgment and decree.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumscription.
6. The question for consideration would be whether once the document has been taken on record under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC what should be the procedure to the followed by the Appellate Court.
7. The Supreme Court in the matter of Shalimar Chemical Works Limited v. Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (Refineries) and others, (2010) 8 SCC 423, has held that once the document is taken on record as additional evidence, opportunity must be given to the other side to produce the evidence in rebuttal if they so desired. Paras 16, 17 and 18 of the report state as under:-
“16. The learned single judge rightly allowed the appellant’s plea for production of the original certificates of registration of trade mark as additional evidence because that was simply in the interest of justice and there was sufficient statutory basis for that under clause (b) of Order 41 Rule 27. But then the Single Judge seriously erred in proceeding simultaneously to allow the appeal and not giving the respondent-defendants an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal of the documents taken in as additional evidence.
17. The Division Bench was again wrong in taking the view that in the facts of the case, the production of additional evidence was not permissible under Order 41 Rule 27. As shown above, the additional documents produced by the appellant were liable to be taken on record as provided under Order 41 Rule 27 (b) in the interest of justice. But it was certainly right in holding that the way the learned Single Judge disposed of the a