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2021 Supreme(Chh) 271
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J.
Anup Kumar Mishra, S/o. Late Shri Revati Raman Mishra - Petitioner
Versus
Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank, Through its Chairman & Ors. - Respondents
Writ Petition (S) No.1084 of 2011
Decided On : 19-08-2021
For the Petitioner:Mr. Manoj Paranjape, Advocate.
For the Respondents:Mr. N. Naha Roy, Advocate.
Headnote:
Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 and 29(2) - Surguja Khestriya Gramin Bank (Officers & Employees) Service Regulation, 2000- Regulations 2000 - Regulation 47 - Application - Condonation of delay - Appeal against order - Petitioner preferred an appeal against order of disciplinary authority dated to Board of Directors on with an application for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal, but that has been dismissed on ground that there is no provision for condonation of delay analogous to Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 in Surguja Khestriya Gramin Bank (Officers & Employees) Service Regulation, 2000 - He would further submit that provisions contained in Section 29(2) of Act would apply and by that Section 5 of Act of 1963 would be attracted and Board of Directors was competent to condone delay in filing an appeal - He would rely upon judgment of Supreme Court in matter of represented - Whether Board of Directors while hearing an appeal under Regulation 47 of Regulations 2000 was entitled to condone delay in filing an appeal applying Section 5 of Act of 1963 by virtue of Section 29(2) of Act – Held, A careful perusal of abovestated provisions would show that Regulation Making Authority never contemplated applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning delay in filing an appeal - As such, provision contained in Section 5 of Act of 1963 would be inapplicable to an appeal preferred under Regulation 48 of Regulations 2000 - Appellate authority / Board of Directors is justified in dismissing appeal as barred by limitation holding that there is no provision for condonation of delay in filing an appeal, as such, Court do not find any merit in this writ petition - However, will not bar petitioner to avail other remedies available under the law - Accordingly, writ petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.
Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:
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The petitioner filed an appeal against an order of disciplinary authority, along with an application for condonation of delay. This appeal was dismissed on the ground that the relevant regulations do not contain provisions for condoning delay analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (!) .
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The petitioner argued that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, would apply, thereby making Section 5 applicable, and that the Board of Directors was competent to condone delay under this provision (!) .
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The respondents contended that the regulations explicitly do not provide for condonation of delay, and thus, the appeal was rightly dismissed as barred by limitation (!) .
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The court examined whether Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to appeals before authorities constituted under special or local laws, particularly whether such authorities are considered courts for the purpose of applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act (!) (!) .
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It was clarified that the scope of Section 29(2) is limited to suits, appeals, and applications filed in courts, and does not extend to proceedings before statutory authorities or quasi-judicial bodies unless explicitly provided (!) (!) (!) .
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The court emphasized that the authority involved in this case, the Board of Directors, functions as a quasi-judicial authority and is not a court, and therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked through Section 29(2) (!) (!) .
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The regulations governing the appeal process explicitly do not include provisions for condoning delay, and the authority making the regulations did not envisage the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in such proceedings (!) (!) .
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Consequently, the dismissal of the appeal as barred by limitation was justified, and the court found no merit in the writ petition seeking to challenge this decision (!) (!) .
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The petitioner is not barred from pursuing other legal remedies available under law, but the specific appeal process under the regulations does not permit condonation of delay through Section 5 of the Limitation Act (!) .
In summary, the court held that provisions of the Limitation Act, particularly Section 5, are not applicable to appeals before authorities like the Board of Directors under the relevant regulations, as these are not courts and the regulations do not provide for condonation of delay.
ORDER :
1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 27.12.2010 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent No.2 by which the petitioner's appeal has been dismissed as barred by limitation.
2. Mr. Manoj Paranjape, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of disciplinary authority dated 3.7.2009 to the Board of Directors on 1.7.2010 with an application for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal, but that has been dismissed on the ground that there is no provision for condonation of delay analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter called as 'Act of 1963') in Surguja Khestriya Gramin Bank (Officers & Employees) Service Regulation, 2000 (hereinafter called as 'Regulations 2000'). He would further submit that the provisions contained in Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963 would apply and by that Section 5 of the Act of 1963 would be attracted and the Board of Directors was competent to condone the delay in filing an appeal. He would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ganesan represented by its power agent G. Rukmani Ganesan v. Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board and others, (2019) 7 SCC 108.
3. On the other hand, Mr. N. Naha Roy, learned counsel for the respondents, would submit that the petitioner's appeal has rightly been dismissed by respondent No.2 as there is no provision in the Regulations 2000.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.
5. Admittedly, the appeal preferred before the Board of Directors under Regulation 47 of the Regulations 2000 has been dismissed by the Board of Directors finding no provision like Section 5 of the Act of 1963 for condonation of delay in filing an appeal before the appellate authority / Board of Directors under the Regulations 2000. Now in this writ petition, aid has been sought to be taken to Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963 relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ganesan (supra) to contend that Section 5 of the Act of 1963 would be applicable.
6. Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963 provides as under:-
“29. Savings.-
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period where the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal, or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
7. The question for consideration in this writ petition would be whether the Board of Directors while hearing an appeal under Regulation 47 of the Regulations 2000 was entitled to condone the delay in filing an appeal applying Section 5 of the Act of 1963 by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Act and whether Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963 would be applicable in filing an appeal before the Board of Directors/Appellate Authority/Quasi-Judicial Authority constituted under the Regulations 2000.
8. In the matter of Ganesan (supra), the question as to whether Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963 can be pressed in service with regard to filing of suit, appeal or application before the statutory authorities and tribunals provided in special or local laws. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to formulate the following questions for consideration in that regard in para-8 as under:-
“8.1.(1)Whether the Commissioner while hearing the appeal under Section 69 of Act, 1959, is a court?
8.2.(2) Whether applicability of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act is with regard to different limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or ap
