( 1 ) ALLOWED, subject to all just exceptions. WP (C) NO. 2133/2000: 1. Rule. With the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties the matter is taken up for final hearing.

( 2 ) THE petitioner is a school covered by the provisions of the Delhi School education Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Education Act ). The respondent No. 1 sought a reference to the Labour Court on the basis of a complaint arising from the termination of his services. On 23. 6. 1992 a reference in the following terms was made by the Secretary (Labour ).

"whether the services of Sh. Gopi Chanda have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?"

( 3 ) IT is not in dispute that this writ petition raises the question as to whether the making of a reference for adjudication is barred by the provisions of the education Act. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Shri H. L. Tikku has cited a judgment of this Court in Amar Nath v. Director of Education, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors. , 2003 (71) DRJ 673 wherein in paragraphs 3 and 4, it was held as follows:

"3. Learned Counsel for the respondent has cited the judgment of the hon ble Supreme Court in Shashi Gaur v. NCT of Delhi and Ors. Reported as JT 2000 (10) SC 481 to contend that even the purported retrenchment challenged by this writ petition would fall under jurisdiction of Section 8 of the Act and therefore there is no bar to approach this Court under article 226 of the Constitution. The Hon ble Supreme Court laid down the following position of law in Shashi Gaur s case (supra): "7. This judgment and the interpretation put to the provisions of sub-Sections (2) and (3) of Section 8 undoubtedly, is of sufficient force. But, the question for out consideration would be that, would it be appropriate for us to give a narrow construction of Sub-section (3) of Section 8, thereby taking the teachers whose services were terminated not by way of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank but otherwise, out of the purview of the Tribunal constituted under section 11 of the Act. The statute has provided for a Tribunal to confer a remedy to the teachers who are often taken out of service by the caprices and whims of the management of the private institutions. The Governmental authorities, having been given certain control over the action of such private management, if an appeal to the Tribunal is not provided to such an employee, then he has to knock the doors of the Court under Article 226 of the constitution which is a discretionary one. The remedy provided by way of an appeal to the Tribunal is undoubtedly a more efficacious remedy to an employee whose services stand terminated after serving the institution for a number of years, as in the present case where the services are terminated after 14 years. 8. In this view of the matter, we are persuaded to take the view that under Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act, an appeal is provided against an order not only of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, which obviously is a major penalty in a disciplinary proceeding, but also against a termination otherwise except where the service itself comes to an end by efflux of time for which the employee was initially appointed. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity with the order of the High Court not entertaining the Writ application in exercise of its discretion, though we do not agree with the conclusion that availability of an alternative remedy oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. "

( 4 ) THUS the above decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court makes it clear that while the petitioner may be directed to approach the Delhi Schools tribunal nevertheless in suitable and appropriate cases, the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not ousted. The Hon ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the correct in