High Court Of Delhi
SATYENDRA KUMAR SHARMA - Appellant
Versus
JITENDER KUDSIA - Respondent
C.R.P. : 276 of 1999
Decided On : 04/21/2005
The dominant purpose of letting found to be residential — Mere use of premises for commercial purposes of coaching of students would not change the dominant purpose of letting — Order of eviction passed against the tenant.
( 1 ) THIS revision petition is directed against the order dated 18. 1. 99 passed by Additional Rent Controller, Delhi whereby he dismissed the petitioner s eviction petition filed u/s 14 (1) (e) read with section 25-B of the DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT, 1958 ( for short the act ) on the ground that purpose of letting was found to be residential-cum- commercial.
( 2 ) BRIEFLY narrated facts leading to this revision petition are that the petitioner filed an eviction petition seeking eviction of the respondent from the premises No. 4965, 4965/1, New Darya Ganj , New Delhi also known as 26, Netaji subhash Marg, Darya Ganj, New Delhi on the ground of personal bonafide requirement. It was pleaded in the petition that property belonged to his father Shri hari Har Saroop Sharma who inducted the respondent as tenant in the mezzanine floor comprising of three rooms along with one bath and WC combined. It was further pleaded in the eviction petition that tenancy commenced in the year 1956 vide a rent note dated 20. 8. 56 and it was for residential purpose only. The petitioner was working with ONGC. He retired as Deputy Director is now living in a rented accommodation at A-57, NDSE Part-I, New Delhi and he requires the demised premises for his own use and occupation for residential purpose. It was further pleaded that as a result of family partition, the demised premises have fallen to his share and he is the owner thereof and he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation available to him. The eviction petition was contested by the respondent who denied the alleged family partition and the ownership of the petitioner. It was further pleaded that the premises were let out for residential-cum- commercial purpose and the respondent herein was running Bharatiya Collage for girls from the demised premises. Respondent got employment in Shri Ram College of commence in the year 1959-1960 so he closed the said institute which was purchased by the petitioner s father in the year 1960. Thereafter his wife started running an educational institute for the girls in the name of Join Us . The respondent had produced some receipts whereby Bhartiya College run by him was purchased by the petitioner s father in the year 1960. In these receipts and in some other receipts the respondent has been described as principle of Bhartiya College. Besides respondent also produced a register for the year 1959-60 containing the name of the teachers and the students of the said college. Two more registers for the year 1981-82 belonging to coaching classes being run by his wife in the name and style Join Us were also produced.
( 3 ) AFTER grant of leave to defend, parties went on trial. Petitioner examined sh. Kishan Singh, an Officer of ONGC, as AW-1; petitioner himself as AW-2 and one Iqbal Singh. AW-3. Respondent examined himself as RW-1 and one O. P. Banati , rw-2. After considering material on record and case laws cited at bar, learned ARC came to the conclusion that petitioner is the owner/landlord and that he requires the demised premises for his own residence as he has no other suitable accommodation. However, on the question of purpose of letting, learned ARC was influenced by the fact that in the receipts and the agreement regarding taking over of the college by the father of the petitioner which have been proved as Ex. RX-4, RX, RX-1, RX-2, the respondent has been described as principle of the Bhartiya College which indicates that he was actually running the said college in the demised premises till 1960 and thereafter his wife has been running the educational institute for the girls in the name of join Us . Learned ARC therefore concluded that purpose of letting was residence- cum-commercial and therefore the provisions of section 14 (1) (e) are not available to the petitioner for seeking eviction of the respondent. Eventually eviction petition was dismissed by the impugned order. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner p
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