VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

( 1 ) THIS Revision is directed against the Order dated 13. 5. 2000 disposing of the Defendant/revisionist s application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC. The Defendant had prayed for the return of the Plaint, since in its opinion Courts at Delhi lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Suit.

( 2 ) IT is well established that at the stage of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 10 or Order VII Rule 11 the averments in the Plaint should alone be looked at. Reference need only be directed to Saleem Bhai Versus State of Maharashtra, 2002 X AD (S. C.) 537. This principle may be somewhat enlarged by making it permissible to also look at the documents filed by the Plaintiff. This is for the reason that the Plaintiff cannot deny the genuineness of documents filed by him. This presumption, however, would not extend to the extremity that every statement made in the document also stands admitted by the Plaintiff. Let us consider the case of a Notice issued by the Plaintiff, and the Reply received thereto. This Reply to the Notice may be filed by the Plaintiff along with the Plaint. In the Reply the Defendant may take any number of objections or positions. By merely filing such a Reply it cannot be posited against the Plaintiff that every content of that document must be read as having been admitted by him.

( 3 ) IN the present case the averments in the Plaint are to the effect that the order was received in Delhi, the goods were dispatched from Delhi, and part payment was received at Delhi. The Defendant, however, seeks to rely on a Clause in the so-called Purchase Order to the following effect:

"3. ALL contracts and orders are deemed to be entered into at Faridabad (Haryana) and any action arising therefrom shall be subject to the jurisdiction courts of Faridabad only or arbitrators appointed by the both sides".

( 4 ) THE case of the Plaintiff is that this term was never agreed upon and that on the contrary, in the Receipts issued by the Plaintiff to the Defendant/revisionist there is an opposing clause to the effect that only Courts at Delhi shall possess jurisdiction. There is palpable controversy on this vexed question which can be effectively and appropriately determined only after an opportunity is afforded to the parties to prove their cases.

( 5 ) IT is well settled that the parties are entitled by agreement to restrict the venue of adjudication of the dispute. However, there cannot be any unilateral agreement. Both the parties must explicitly agree to the ouster of the jurisdiction of other Courts and restrict it to one Court alone. The Court to which the territorial jurisdiction is reserved must, in the first place, enjoy jurisdiction to entertain the Suit. So far as this point is concerned one has to look at the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. The opinion of the Hon ble Supreme Court in ABC Laminart vs. A. P. Agencies, AIR 1989 SC 1239 = 1989 (2) SCC 163 is topically instructive. The parties had entered into a supply contract in Madras, one of the terms of which was that if any dispute arose out of that sale it " shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction". A suit for recovery of money came to be filed in Salem instead, and the Trial Court returned the plaint for presentation in the proper Court. The Apex Court opined that a clause envisaging a complete ouster of the jurisdiction of all the Courts ordinarily possessing jurisdiction would be void as being contrary to public policy or if the agreed venue had no connection with the contract. However, the Court pronounced that there was no legal irregularity in the parties to a contract agreeing to a venue which is one amongst several others ordinarily possessing territorial jurisdiction. Their Lordships thereafter clarified that the phrase cause of action means " every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgement of the Court". On facts, it was opined that the c

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