VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

( 1 ) BY these Orders I shall dispose of a Petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 in which it has been prayed that, pending arbitration, the respondents be directed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per month commencing from 15th January, 2001, in lieu of cheques already issued by them. The property in question comprises the urban/rural premises measuring 7695 Sq. ft. of stables and Manager s house of Jai Vilas Palace, Mount Abu. (Rajasthan ). The Lease Deed is between the president of India and Petitioner through the defence Estate Officer, Rajasthan Circle, jaipur.

( 2 ) I am of the opinion that this Court does not possess territorial jurisdiction to entertain this Petition. I had suggested that the Petition be returned with liberty to file it in Courts at mount Abu or any other Court possessing territorial jurisdiction. Mr. Singla, however, has insisted that it is only the Union of India, through the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, south Block, New Delhi that can take the decision as to whether to re-hire or de-hire the premises. Even though I think that this submission is not factually correct, assuming it to be so, it is well settled that the Union of india has its operations throughout the country. As has already been noted, the lease was not executed by the Secretary, ministry of Defence, New Delhi but by respondent No. 2, namely, the Defence Estate officer.

( 3 ) IT is too late in the day to contend that merely because the Union of India has its headquarters in Delhi, Courts located in the capital could properly exercise jurisdiction over every dispute where it has been impleaded as a party. Assuming for the sake of arguments that a part of the cause of action has arisen in New Delhi, I am still of the considered opinion that this Court should abjure from exercising jurisdiction since there are other Courts which are better suited to entertain the disputes that have been raised in this Petition. The decision of the M/s. Patel Roadways Limited Bombay Vs. M/s. Prasad Trading Company, AIR 1992 sc 1514 immediately comes to mind. The ratio of the Judgment is that if a Corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, litigation must be commenced in that place alone, regardless of apparently wider enabling provision in Section 20. The Court adopted a realistic, businesslike and expedient approach in opining that - "it would be a great hardship if, in spite of the corporation having a subordinate office at the place where the cause of action arises (with which in all probability the plaintiff has had dealings), such plaintiff is to be compelled to travel to the place where the Corporation has its principal place. That place should be convenient to the plaintiff; and since the corporation has an office at such place, it will also be under no disadvantage". The significance of this Judgment is that it restricts jurisdiction, whether a contractual clause of this nature exists or not, to the particular place where the cause of action has substantially arisen, overruling other places which may have jurisdiction under Section 20 of thecpc.

( 4 ) IN Sector Twenty One Owners Welfare association. Vs. Air Force Naval Housing board and Ors. 65 (1997) DLT 81 (DB), a division Bench of this Court has held that a trivial or insignificant part of the cause of action arising at a particular place would not be enough to confer writ jurisdiction on the court to entertain the lis. The Division Bench noticed from the various decisions that the emphasis had shifted from the residence or location of the person or authority sought to be proceeded against to the situs of the accrual of cause of action. There is no reason why the observations pertaining to writ petitions should not be extrapolated to petitions such as the present one. The bench held as follows :-

"13. The law as reflected by the above- said decisions is that the emphasis has shifted from the resi

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