( 1 ) PETITIONER was enrolled in the army on 15th December, 2000. He was posted in Rajasthan and thereafter for some offence of theft, a Court of Enquiry was ordered against the petitioner and after recording of summary of evidence, General Court Martial commenced and the petitioner was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years and was dismissed from service.

MR. S. M. Dalal, learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the proceedings under General Court Martial under the Army Act and has prayed that the conviction and sentence be quashed and the petitioner be released from jail. Another prayer in the writ petition is that petitioner be reinstated in service with consequential benefits. The first submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was a juvenile and he could not have been tried by the provisions of General Court Martial under the Army Act. Mr. Dalal has contended that after coming into force of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, the applicability of the said Act is to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. He has placed reliance on Section 2 (k) which defines that juvenile or child means a persons who has not completed eighteenth year of age. Section 2 (l) further defines "juvenile in conflict with law" as a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence. Section 2 (p) defines offence as an offence punishable under any law for the time being in force.

MR. DALAL has further contended that a careful reading of section 6 which has a non obstante clause and nothing has been saved from the applicability of the aforesaid Act, it provides that any proceedings to punish the juvenile for imprisonment is contrary to the mandate of the Parliament. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Major E. G. Barsay Vs. State of Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1762 and has placed reliance on the following observation of the Supreme Court which is to the following effect:- "there is a more formidable obstacle in the way of learned counsel s argument. Section 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1952, reads :

"notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898) or in any other law the offences specified in sub-section (1) of Section 6 shall be triable by Special Judges only. "doubtless the Army Act is comprehended by the words "any other law". The offences with which we are now concerned are certainly offences specified in sub-sec. (1) of S. 6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. The non obstante clause in S. 7 clearly confers jurisdiction to try persons committing the said offences on a special judge. But it is contended that the Army Act is a special Act and therefore, S. 7 found in the general Act cannot take away the jurisdiction conferred on a court-martial in respect of the said offences. That proposition of law may have some bearing when there is a conflict of jurisdiction arising out of a general Act and a special Act without any specific exclusion of the jurisdiction in the general Act of that conferred under the special Act. But that principle may not have any relevance to a case where the general Act in express terms confers jurisdiction on a particular tribunal in respect of specified offences to the exclusion of anything contained in any other law. In such a situation, the intention of the Legislature is clear and unambiguous, and no question of applying any rule of interpretation would arise, for the rules of interpretation are evolved only to ascertain the intention of the Legislature. "

HE has also placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of In re : Sessions Judge 1995 Crl. L. J. 330. He has also relied upon a judgment of Supreme Court in the case of gopinath Ghosh Vs. State of West Bengal 1984 (Supp) SCC 228. On the other hand, Mr. Akshay Makhija, learned counsel