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2004 Supreme(Del) 810

High Court Of Delhi
CHARANJEET SINGH - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI - Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL 518 of 2003
Decided On : 09/24/2004

Advocates Appeared:
A.K.SHARMA, PRAMIL KUMAR, Ravinder Chadha, S.S.GANDHI, SUNIL KULKARNI, VIVEK BHARDWAJ

The relevant date for determining the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act, with respect to the age of the accused, is the date of occurrence and not the date of trial.

Headnote:

Juvenile Justice Act - Applicability - Section 302 IPC - [JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT] - [Section 2(k), Section 20, Section 64] - The court discussed the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act in a case where the accused, though above 16 but below 18 years at the time of the offence, was tried and convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The court held that the relevant date for determining the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act is the date of occurrence and not the date of trial. It emphasized the need for a liberal and meaningful construction of the Act to achieve the ultimate object of social reintegration and rehabilitation of juveniles in conflict with the law. The court also referred to the standards adopted by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and held that the provisions of the Act should be liberally construed to make them more meaningful to achieve the ultimate object of the legislation. The court further relied on previous decisions and held that the accused, being a juvenile at the time of the occurrence, should have been dealt with in accordance with the Juvenile Justice Act.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant faced trial for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for causing homicidal death of his school mate. The sole contention was whether the appellant, being less than 18 years of age at the time of the incident, could be sentenced by the trial court.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the relevant date for determining the applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act is the date of occurrence and not the date of trial. It further quashed the sentence awarded to the appellant and directed his release, as he was now aged more than 20 years and not required to be sent to the Juvenile Justice Board.

Issues: The main issue was whether the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act were attracted in the case, considering the age of the appellant at the time of the offence.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the relevant date for applicability of the Juvenile Justice Act, with respect to the age of the accused, would be the date of occurrence and not the date of trial. It emphasized the need for a liberal and meaningful construction of the Act to achieve the ultimate object of social reintegration and rehabilitation of juveniles in conflict with the law.

Final Decision: The appeal was partly allowed, sustaining the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, but quashing the sentence and directing his release.

D. K. JAIN, J.

( 1 ) IN Sessions Case No. 104/02, arising out of FIR no. 634/98, the appellant faced trial for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the Code) for allegedly causing homicidal death of his school mate Abhinav Singhal, a student of 9th class in Army Public School, Dhaula Kuan, New Delhi. By the impugned judgment and order, the learned additional Sessions Judge, Delhi while holding the appellant guilty for the said offence has convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of six months.

( 2 ) SINCE before us learned counsel for the appellant has not assailed the finding on conviction recorded by the learned trial court and has confined his arguments only on the competency of the trial court to award sentence to the appellant, we deem it unnecessary to state the facts. The sole contention urged by learned counsel for the appellant is that since on the date of incident, the appellant was less than 18 years of age, he was a juvenile within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short the Juvenile Justice Act ), and, therefore, he could not be sentenced by the learned additional Sessions Judge. In support of the claim, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the original birth certificate issued by the Indore Municipal corporation and a copy of the certificate issued by the central Board of Secondary Education, which show that the date of birth of the appellant is 9 August 1981.

( 3 ) PURSUANT to a direction by the Court, an inquiry has been conducted by the SHO, Vasant Kunj Police station, New Delhi in regard to the genuineness of the birth certificate and a verification report dated 22 May 2004 has been filed in that behalf. As per the report, the birth certificate issued on 15 February 1982 by the office of the Sub-Registrar, Birth-Death, Municipal corporation of Indore is genuine. There is, therefore, no dispute with regard to the age of the appellant. According to the birth certificate, the age of the appellant was over 16 years but less than 18 years as on 23 October 1998, viz. , the date of incident. Thus, as per the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter REFERRED TO as the old Act ) on the date of occurrence, being more than 16 years of age, the appellant was not a juvenile but as per the Juvenile justice Act, which came into force on 1 April 2001 he was juvenile within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the said act having not completed 18 years of age. Hence, the limited controversy, which arises for resolution, is whether the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act are attracted in the instant case ?

( 4 ) WE have heard Mr. Sunil Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Ravinder Chadha, learned counsel for the State and Mr. S. S. Gandhi, learned senior counsel for the parents of the deceased.

( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has contended that since the trial court was dealing with a juvenile, after recording the finding that he was guilty of committing an offence, for the purpose of sentence, the appellant ought to have been REFERRED TO the Juvenile justice Board in terms of Section 20 of the Juvenile justice Act. It is asserted that the court of sessions had no jurisdiction to pass any order of sentence against the appellant and, therefore, the order of sentence is null and void. Per contra, it is submitted by Mr. Gandhi that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act cannot be extended to the appellant because he was not a juvenile under the Old Act, which was in vogue at the time of incident.

( 6 ) THUS, as noted supra, the main question for consideration is whether a boy who had completed more than 16 years but was less than 18 years of age at the time of commission of the offence before the commencement of the Juvenile

















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