The court emphasized the legislative intent of expeditious disposal of divorces by mutual consent and considered the impact of the continuance of a marriage on the spouses' hardship and prospects of re-marriage.

( 1 ) ALLOWED subject to all just exceptions. Delay in filing the present appeal stands condoned. FAO 756/2003: this is an appeal against the order of the Additional District Judge, delhi dated 9th September, 2003, passed in H. M. A. No. 550/2003 by which an application r loved by both the parties, i. e. , appellant No. 1, Pooja Gupta and the appehant No. 2, Nikhil Badhwar on 16th July, 2003 seeking permission to present the petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage act, 1955 (in short the hma ) for divorce by mutual consent prior to the expiry of one year from the date of marriage of the parties, i. e. , 5th Fe bruary, 2003 was rejected.

( 2 ) THE relevant portion of the proviso to Section 14 of the HMA reads as follows : "14 (1 ). Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall not be competent for any Court to entertain any petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce [unless at the date of the presentation of the petition one year has elapsed] since the date of the marriage: provided that the Court may, upon application made to it ir taccordance with such rules as may be made by the High Court in that behalf, allow a petition to be presented [before one year has elapsed] since the date of the marriage on the ground that the case is one o/f exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, but if it appears to the Court at the hearing of the petition that the petitioner obtained leave to present the petition by any misrepresentation or concealment of the nature of the case, the Court may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the comdition that the decree shall not have effect until after the [expiry of one year] from the date of the marriage or may dismiss the petition without prejudice to any petition which may be brought after the [expiration of the said one year] upon the same or substantially the same facts as those alleged in support of the petition so dismissed. "

( 3 ) BOTH the parties have contended that their plea for exemption from waiting for one year under proviso under Section 14 (1) of the Act should have been granted since they have never resided together from the very first day of their marriage and the marriage had not even been consummated. It has further been contended that the parties have realised that they have irrec oncilable differences between them and being professionals will suffer mental as well as physical hardship on account of the continuation of their marriage. It has also been submitted that an early divorce by mutual consent in the present circumstances will also enable them to rearrange their lives matrimonially and career-wise. It was also stated that the 1st appellant had been offered an alliance from abroad and the 2nd appellant an employment offer.

( 4 ) ON these grounds, the exemption for presenting the petiticn under section 13 (B) (1) of the Actprior to the one year from the dateof the marriage, i. e. , 5th February, 2003 was sought. The impugned order dated 9th September, 2003 has noted that the exceptional hardship has not been explained by the parties. The impugned judgment has declined the appljca tion mainly onthe basis that there was a love marriage between the parties and it cannot be presumed that the love was lost immediately after the marriage. It was also held that exceptional hardship was not proved and that there could be external influence may be from the parents.

( 5 ) IN my view, the parties have given sufficient indication of the hardships for seeking exemption for expiry of one year in their petition before the Additional District Judge. Merely because the marriage between the parties was a love marriage, cannot be a ground for not granting permission to the parties to present the petitioner under Section 13-B of the act particularly when the appellants were mature professional aged about 30 and 32 years of age respectively and had pleaded exceptional hardship.