High Court Of Delhi
HARI CHAND - Appellant
Versus
PSP BUILDERS AND PROMOTERS - Respondent
Interim Application 8572 of 2002
Decided On : 02/11/2003
Held :
There is unexplained delay and apparent negligence even in the filing of the first application in which it had been prayed that the counsel for the Defendant be ordered to provide the particulars of the LRs. In normal circumstances, I would favor the stand that the obligation cast on the counsel for the erstwhile counsel for the deceased party does not extend beyond informing the Court of his demise. The duty cast by the Court on the counsel, for providing the details of the LRs was, thereforee, beyond the con templation of law. Be that as it may, these details were supplied by the erstwhile counsel for Defendant No. 2 on 18/10/2002. Applying the maxim that no party can be prejudiced by an act of the Court, and keeping in perspective the directions of the Court passed on 91712002, calling upon the counsel for Defendant No. 2 to provide the details of the LRs, knowledge of the death in the circumstances of this case can be extended up to 18/10/2002 and no further.
Keeping in mind the fact that the Suit had already abated, it is difficult to excuse the Plaintiff for not taking immediate steps for impleading LRs of deceased Defendant No. 2. In the application for seeking condensation of delay all that is staled is that the Plaintiff was awaiting the disclosures to be made by the counsel for Defendant No. 2. Thereafter, it is stated that immediately the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 151 of the C.P.C. has been filed. No Explanationn is forthcoming as to why it took so much time to file the application, viz. 4/12/2002.
The purpose of prescribing periods of limitation is to lay down the circumstances in which a particular party may rest or "repose" assured that its liability has come to an end. That is why the Acts of Limitation have quite often been referred to as the statute of repose. The conduct of the Plaintiff was extremely negligible, even after 18/10/2002 when the counsel for Defendant No. 2 had discharged the burden placed on him by the Court. The duty was not discharged by the filing of the previous application. Assuming, for the purposes of the present Suit that the relevant date was 18/10/2002, there is no reason for granting latitude beyond one week, and certainly not beyond thirty days. No grounds for condoning the delay have been disclosed or are made out.
( 1 ) THESE applications have been filed consequent upon the death of Defendant No. 2 on 17/12/2001. On 30/3/2001, this Court had ordered Dasti notice to the non-applicants through counsel, returnable on 16/7/2001. An application for amendment, which counsel for the parties state is yet to be disposed of, had been filed by the Plaintiff to implead, inter alia, the wife, and now widow of Defendant No. 2. Although steps were taken for serving her, these steps remained futile. In the proceedings held on 8/3/2002, it was recorded that the summons issued to the wife of Defendant No. 2 have been received back unserved with the Report that she was not found/living at the given address and the house was found locked. Hon ble Mr. Justice J. D. Kapoor had observed that " though there is a presumption of service but as a matter of precaution let their service be effected by affixation and at the conspicuous place of the Court House". The relevance of mentioning these Orders is that the case was listed before the Court on several occasions between December, 2001 and July, 2002, and yet the Court was not informed of the death, even though the dispute remained active and notices were being sent to the widow of Defendant No. 2 at the address available on the file. Had the matter been dormant, the failure to immediately inform the Court may have been viewed differently.
( 2 ) ON 9/7/2002, the erstwhile counsel for Defendant No. 2 informed the Court of the demise of Defendant No. 2. On that date, he was directed as follows:
" Let the name of legal heirs be supplied to learned counsel for plaintiffs. Learned counsel for plaintiffs seeks time to move an appropriate application for impleading LRs of Defendant No. 2. "
( 3 ) IA No. 8572/02 was filed on 16/9/2000. It is relevant to record that the application is dated 14/8/2002 and has been filed thereafter quite obviously because the affidavit of Shri Hari Chand in support thereof was sworn only on 16/9/2000. This is also obvious from the over-writing in the affidavit. The prayer in this application is that the Court direct learned counsel for the Defendant to supply the names and addresses of the Legal Representatives (LRs) of the deceased Defendant No. 2 and that the same may be permitted to be brought on record as Defendants. By this time, over two months had already elapsed, out of which one month had been lost solely because of the inactivity of Shri Hari Chand, the Plaintiff. By letter dated 18/10/2002, addressed to the learned counsel for the Plaintiff by learned counsel for Defendant No. 1, he was informed of the details of the five LRs deceased-Defendant No. 2.
( 4 ) EVENTUALLY IA No. 11439/02 dated 28/11/2002 under Section 151 C. P. C. read with Order XXII Rule 4 CPC and IA No. 11440/02 dated 28/11/2002 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed on 4/12/2002.
( 5 ) THE applications are vehemently opposed by Mr. K. R. Gupta, learned counsel for the Defendant. It is his contention that Rule 10a of Order XXII CPC places an obligation on the counsel of the deceased party to merely inform the Court of the death of such party. When Clause 76- sub- clause (v) of the C. P. C. Amendment Act, 1976 is perused, it does not shed any further light on the purpose behind the amendment. All that is stated in the Objects and Reasons is that the new Rule 10 A is being inserted to impose an obligation on the pleaders of the parties to communicate to the Court the death of the party represented by him. Mr. Gupta contends that since his engagement as an Advocate for Defendant No. 2 had come to an end by that death, no further duty or obligation should have been fastened on him. He has further contended that the Plaintiff is admittedly and uncontrovertably dominus litis and is, therefore, solely responsible for the progress of the Suit. He has also contended that no sufficient ground has been shown for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
( 6 ) MR. KOHLI, learned counsel
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