Section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Court where an application in any reference under the Act is made, and all subsequent applications arising out of that reference and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court alone and in no other Court.

( 1 ) THIS appeal raises an interesting issue viz. , whether this Court was incompetent to decide appellant s objections filed under Sections 30/33 of the arbitration Act for setting aside the award when the value of the subject matter was less that Rs. 4. lacs.

( 2 ) LEARNED Trial Judge has held so and transferred the proceedings to the district Court on the ground that since pecuniary jurisdiction of District Court was raised from Rs. 1 lac to Rs. 5 lacs by amendment in the Punjab Courts Act, this Court had lost the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

( 3 ) IT all started with appellant filing a petition (S. No. 2686-A/90) under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act in this Court. In this, reference was made to the sole arbitrator (Secretary of respondent No. 1)by order dated 27. 11. 1995. An award was passed on 26. 11. 1997. Appellant thereafter applied for filing of the award in this court which was done. Appellant then filed objections to this award under Sections 30/33 of the Old Arbitration Act (IA No. 8835/98 ). When the matter came up for consideration, learned Trial Judge is said to have suo motu taken notice of the non- maintainability of these proceedings before him leading to the passing of the impugned order transferring the proceedings to District Court.

( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellant says that the learned Trial Judge had transferred the proceedings in disregard of the provisions of Section 31 (4) of the Old arbitration Act and also the Supreme Court judgment in Kumbha Mauji v. Union of India , AIR1953 SC 313, on the issue. It is submitted by him that under Section 31 (4) only that Court had the exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings where any application in any reference was made. Since the reference was made by this Court and subsequent applications were also filed here, therefore, this Court alone was competent to deal with the proceedings arising out of the Award dated 26. 11. 1997. Reliance in this regard is placed on the Supreme Court judgment (supra ).

( 5 ) RESPONDENTS Counsel concedes this position fairly. He has not put forth any alternative proposition to suggest that High Court was divested of its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim merely because pecuniary jurisdiction of the District court was enhanced to Rs. 5 lacs.

( 6 ) WE have examined the impugned order and it appears to us that learned trial Judge had misconstrued the legal position on the issue. He seems to have overlooked the import of Section 31 (4) of the Old Arbitration Act in the matter.

( 7 ) THE relevant provision reads:

"notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force where in any reference any application under this Act has been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that reference and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court. "

( 8 ) SECTION 31 (4) starts with a non obstante clause to override anything contained in any other law for the time being in force while laying down that where in any reference any application under this Act was made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone would have the jurisdiction on the arbitration proceedings and that all applications arising out of that reference and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court alone and in no other Court. The mandate of provision is clear and unequivocal. It vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Court in which an application in any reference under the Arbitration Act is made. Whether such application was made during the reference or before it is immaterial for our purposes in the factual context of the present case. While dealing with that aspect supreme could held in Kumbha Mauji s case :

"in the contest of Section 31, Sub-section (4), it is reasonable to think that the phrase "in any refer