( 1 ) THIS petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code only) is directed against an order dated 3. 2. 2000 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi by which a Revision petition filed by the petitioner/complainant against an order dated 21. 10. 1997 passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate discharging the accused under Section 498-A, IPC was dismissed.

( 2 ) THE petitioner/complainant had filed a complaint against respondents No. 1 to 4 on the basis of which FIR No. 252/1995 under Sections 498-A/406 IPC was registered at PS Rajouri Garden, New Delhi After investigations charge sheet under Section 173 of the Code was filed. Learned Metropolitan Magistrate declined to frame a charge against the respondents under Section 498-A of the ipc in view of the bar created by Section 468 of the Code as the FIR had been filed beyond a period of three years. However, charge under Section 406 IPC was ordered to be framed against respondents No. 1, 2 and 3. The petitioner/complainant filed a Revision which was dismissed by learned ASJ vide orders dated 3. 2. 2000. The learned ASJ upheld the order passed by learned Metropolitan magistrate and held that since no explanation had been given for the delay in the filing of the FIR, the provisions of Section 473 of the Code could not be invoked to condone the delay

( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner relies upon a judgement of the Apex court in Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy and Others, (1993) 3 scc 4 to contend that it was not necessary for the complainant-petitioner to ex- plain the delay and pray for condonation thereof inasmuch as Section 473 of the code casts a duty upon the Court to examine as to whether such delay has been explained or not and as to whether the interests of justice demand condoning of the delay or ignoring it altogether. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, relies upon a judgement of this High Court Sukhbir Jain and Anr. v. State, 1994 (1) CC. Cases 609 in which the bar of Section 468 of the Code was invoked in a case under Section 498-A IPC. In this case the cruelty was taken as condoned upon joining back of husband by the wife. He also relies upon the judgements State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1054 and Srinivas pal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 1729 to contend that object of speedy trial cannot be thwarted by circumventing the provisions of section 468 of Code. It is contended that the facts and circumstances of this case clearly show that the petitioner/complainant had left her matrimonial home in the year 1991 whereas the FIR was made in the year 1995 and since there was no act of cruelty committed by the respondent qua the petitioner after her leaving the matrimonial home the cognizance for the offence under Section 498-A IPC could not be taken after three years.

( 4 ) AFTER considering the submissions and the judgements relied upon by counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the view taken by the two Courts below was contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Vanta radhamanohari (Supra) and as such, the impugned orders discharging the respondents under Section 498-A of the IPC cannot be sustained. In the case of vanta Radhamanohari also, the Apex Court had noticed that the complainant had left her matrimonial home in the year 1985 but had filed the complaint in the year 1990. It was argued before their Lordships that after leaving her matrimonial home in 1985, there could not be any matrimonial cruelty as defined under Section 498- a of the IPC but it was held that the Courts while considering the question of limitation for an offence under Section 498-A of the IPC should judge the question of limitation in the light of Section 473 of the Code which requires the Court not merely to examine as to whether the delay has been properly explained or not but also as to whether it is necessary to ignor