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2002 Supreme(Del) 658
High Court Of Delhi
SUDESH KUMAR - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF DELHI - Respondent
Decided On : 05/08/2002
The key legal principle established in the judgment is that orders which substantially affect the rights of the accused or adjudicate certain rights of the parties cannot be considered interlocutory orders, making revision petitions maintainable.
Headnote:
S. K. Agarwal - Criminal Procedure - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 482/483 - Summary: The court discussed the maintainability of a revision petition against the order framing charges under sections 147/149/186/353/332/342/506 of the Indian Penal Code. The key legal provisions interpreted were the definition of 'interlocutory order' under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and its impact on the rights of the accused. The court relied on authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court to determine the maintainability of the revision petition.
Fact of the Case:
The petition was filed against the order dismissing the revision petition, which challenged the order framing charges under sections 147/149/186/353/332/342/506 of the Indian Penal Code.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the order framing charge against the accused substantially affects their rights and is not merely an interlocutory order, making the revision petition maintainable.
Issues: The main issue was the maintainability of the revision petition against the order framing charges under the Indian Penal Code.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court to interpret the term 'interlocutory order' and its impact on the rights of the accused.
Final Decision: The petition was allowed, and the impugned order dismissing the revision on the ground of non-maintainability was set aside. The Addl. Sessions Judge was directed to decide the revision petition on merits.
Key Points: - The court held that the order framing charges substantially affects the rights of the accused and is not an interlocutory order, making revision petition maintainable. (!) (!) - The term "interlocutory order" has been interpreted in a restricted sense in CrPC Section 397(2); orders that adjudicate or affect substantial rights cannot be considered interlocutory and are revisable. (!) - For the Special Courts Act, the expression "interlocutory order" is used in its natural sense, not a broader sense, and the revision against the order framing charges is maintainable. (!) - Authority: Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (AIR 1977 SC 2185) and V. C. Shukla v. State (AIR 1980 SC 962) are cited to define interlocutory vs. substantive orders. (!) (!) - The impugned order dated 18 February 2002 framing charges under IPC sections 147/149/186/353/332/342/506 was set aside, and the Addl. Sessions Judge was directed to decide the revision on merits. (!) - The petition challenged the order dismissing the revision as non-maintainable against the framing of charges; the court allowed the petition and remanded for merits consideration. (!) - The factual background involves alleged unlawful assembly and obstruction of public servants, leading to framing of charges and subsequent revision petition. (!) (!)
What is the maintainability of a revision petition against an order framing charges under IPC Sections 147/149/186/353/332/342/506?
What constitutes an interlocutory order in the context of Section 397(2) CrPC and those applicable under Special Courts Act Section 11(1), as it affects the rights of the accused?
( 1 ). This petition under Sections 482/483 of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "cr. P. C. ") is directed against the order dated 18th February, 2002 passed by Sh. D. C. Anand, Addl. Sessions Judge, Shahdara, Delhi dismissing revision petition, as not, maintainable against the order dated 7th August, 2001 framing charges under sections 147/149/186/353/332/342/506 Indian Penal Code in case FIR No. 247/98 P. S. Vivek Vihar by ACMM.
( 2 ). Notice. Mr. Pawan Sharma accepts, notice on behalf of state. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the point Involved in the revision petition is very short and the same can be heard and disposed of at this stage itself.
( 3 ). Prosecution allegations, in brief, are that on 29th august, 1998 at about 4. 30 p. m. al Anaj Mandi Chowk, shahdara, petitioners along with others formed an un-lawful assembly with the common object of obstructing the SDM, vilvek Vihar and other Government officials from discharging their public duties and used criminal force against them. They wrongfully confined the SDM and threatened the said public servants with dire consequences. The case was registered and petitioners wore arrested. After completion od investigation, challan was filed. On the basis of material available on record, Addl. Chief Metropolitan magistrate on 7th August, 2001 held that prima facie case under the above noted Sections is made out against the petitioners. Charge was framed against them. Aggrieved by the said order, petitioners filed a revision petition which came up for hearing before Addl. Sessions Judge, who by impugned judgment and order dated 18th February, 2002 held that order framing charge is an interlocutory order and revision against such an order Is not maintainable under section 397 (2) Code of Criminal Procedure and dismissed the same, while so holding reliance was placed on the observations made by the supreme Court in V. C. Shukla vs. State, AIR 1980 SC 962 and a decision of Single Bench of Kerala High Court in sarojini Amma Vs. Sarojini, 1988 crl. L. J. 1362. This order is under challenge.
( 4 ). Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the order framing charge against the accused affects and adjudicates their rights on a particular aspect of the trial, therefore, the same cannot be said bo be interlocutory order, beyond the purview of revisional jurisdiction. Learned APP for the State very frankly conceded the same.
( 5 ). The issue whether the order framing charge is an interlocutory order or not, is settled by authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court. In Amar Nath V. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 it was held :-
"it seems to us that the term "interlocutory order in S. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabi]ities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis of insertion of this particular provision in s. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for a reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceedings, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be Interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. "
( 6 ). Again the expression "interlocutory order" as used in Section 11 (1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979 came up for considerati
