High Court Of Delhi
MODERN FOOD INDUSTRIES - Appellant
Versus
I.K.MALIK - Respondent
Decided On : 05/17/2002
Held:
We also find no merits in the arguments of Mr. Amitabh Narayan that because of the contract entered into by the parties vide their letter dated 1.6.92 and 3.7.92, the appellant had been deprived of the protection under Delhi Rent Control Act. This arguments deserve rejection for the simple reason that Amended Delhi Rent Control Act came into force in 1988 thereby providing that if the rent is more than Rs. 3,500/- p.m. then the tenant is not protected under the said Act and in that case Act would not apply to such landlord and tenants. The appellant voluntarily choose to give up the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act in 1992 when he increased the Rent to Rs. 10,000/- per month and thereafter to Rs. 11,500/- p.m. Appellant, now, cannot turn around to say that he was misled in increasing the rent in order to deprive him the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appellant ought to have known that by paying the rent at the rate of Rs. 11,500/-p.m., it will come out of the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Hence, at this stage appellant cannot be allowed to urge that he has been deprived of the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act which he did voluntarily. The mere fact that enhanced payment was made and accepted in terms of the un registered letter dated 3rd July, 1992, to our mind, does not give rise to a right of tenancy for more than a year in favor of the appellant.
( 1 ) APPELLANT Modern Food Industries (India) limited was a tenant in the premises bearing No. C-17, l. S. C.-I Paschimi Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. The premises consisted of first and Mezzanine floors measuring an area of about 1817 Sq. ft. The tenancy was on month to month basis. The tenancy month commenced from 1st day of each English calendar month. The tenancy period was to expire in July, 1998. The landlords of the property asked the appellant/defendant to vacate the premises. When it was not vacated, legal notice dated 11/07/1998 was issued. It was got served on the appellant/defendant on 14/07/1998 thereby terminating the tenancy from the midnight of 31/07/1998. In the notice it was also made clear that if the appellant/defendant continue to occupy the premises he shall be liable to pay damages/mesne profit @ rs. 1,25,000/- per month. Appellant/defendant while acknowledging the notice declined to vacate the premises on the plea that the lease in question could not be terminated as the tenancy period had yet not expired. That lease period was extended by mutual consent. Tenancy period was to come to an end only on 31st may,2002.
( 2 ) THE appellant/defendant s defence was that the premises was in its occupation much before the respondent/plaintiff purchased this property. The appellant/defendant was tenant in the premises since 1 2/04/1972. That the said lease stood extended for a further period of 10 years vide letter dated 1/06/1992. With extension of lease period the rate of rent was also increased to Rs. 11,500. 00. That the respondent started accepting the revised rate of rent after lease was renewed. Hence respondent/plaintiff could not be allowed to terminate the tenancy till 31st May, 2002.
( 3 ) RESPONDENT/plaintiffs moved an application under Order 12 Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure (in short C. P. C.) and sought decree. According to him since the facts were admitted hence decree forthwith could be passed. By the impugned judgment the learned trial court passed the decree of ejectment in favour of the respondent/plaintiffs and also directed payment of future mesne profits payable with effect from 1/08/1998 till recovery of possession. But with regard to quantum of damage, the trial court ordered initiation of an enquiry under Order 20 Rule 12 C. P. C.
( 4 ) IF is against this order that the present appeal has been preferred. Before we take up the appeal on merits, we would like to pin down the disturhing trend which is taking place at the Bar. In this case on the very first date when the case was taken up for admission, mr. Amarjeet Singh Chandhiok, Senior Advocate with mr. Raman Kapoor appeared. Counsel made a statement that the appellant volunteered to hand over the vacant peaceful possession of the premises in question to the respondent on 30th April, 2002. We accordingly recorded this concession and disposed off the appeal. But thereafter appellant engaged a new counsel. The new counsel filed the present application challenging the authority of the counsel who made the concession on behalf of the appellant. According to this new counsel the appellant never instructed the counsel that premises shall be vacated on 30. 4. 2002. Therefore, according to mr. Amitabh Narayan the concession made by the counsel amounted to oral agreement which was in violation of the provision of Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 11 C. P. C. The said oral compromise having not been signed by any party hence not enforceable in law and that direction be given to the trial court not to proceed with enquiry under order 20 Rule 12 C. P. C. We are surprised on this conduct of the appellant and the counsel because till date power of attorney of Mr. Raman Kapoor has not been withdrawn. By merely changing the counsel a litigant cannot be allowed to make accusation against another counsel. Secondly if such applications are allowed and entertained then the court will never believe any statement made by a counsel in the court. We acc
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