( 1 ). This is an application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC seeking interim decree for possession on the basis of admitted facts.

( 2 ). There is no dispute as to the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties. The only dispute is with regard to the nature of tenancy and the service of notice determining the tenancy.

( 3 ). The application is being resisted mainly on the ground that as per own understanding of the plaintiff the tenancy created by way of registered lease deed ended on 31. 8. 99 but was orally extended upto 29. 2. 2000 for a period of six months and, therefore, the possession of the defendant was by way of a month to month tenancy which was terminable in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882 and since in the instant case the service of notice of termination of tenancy has not been proved no decree under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC can be passed as such a decree can be passed only on the premise of admitted facts.

( 4 ). According to the plaintiff the notice of termination of tenancy was duly served upon the defendants at both the addresses including the demised premises. The certificate obtained by the plaintiff from the Postal authorities with regard to the service of registered notice dated 8/06/2000 shows that the notice addressed to Mr. O. P. Bhartia, defendant no. 2 was duly received and served at the demised premises. He was referred as a Chairman of defendant no. 1 company in whose favour the tenancy was created.

( 5 ). In support of the contention that the occupation of the lessee after the expiry of the lease period amounts to holding over as a tenant on month to month basis as contemplated under Section 116 of the transfer of Property Act, Mr. Nayyar, learned senior counsel for the defendants has placed reliance upon Satish chand Makhan and others vs. Govardhan Das Byas and others air 1984 SC 143 wherein a view was taken that in a case where a tenant continues to be in occupation after the expiry of the lease period, he holds over as tenant from month to month under Section 106 of the Act.

( 6 ). The averment of the plaintiff that he at first instance had verbally terminated the tenancy on 1. 9. 99, but allowed the request of the defendant to extend the tenancy for another six months on compassionate grounds was met with the plea of bald denial as to either verbal termination of tenancy or verbal extension of tenancy period for another six months.

( 7 ). In order to appreciate the rival contentions the relevant paras of the pleadings viz. plaint and written statement need to be reproduced. These are:-

( 8 ). As is apparent from the denials made in the written statement, these are unspecific and evasive and therefore no denials in the eyes of law. Order 8 Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure lays down that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.

( 9 ). The observations of the Supreme Court in this regard made in Badat and Company, Bombay Vs. East India trading Company AIR 1964 SC 538 need to be quoted and are as under:-

"rules 3,4 and 5 of Order 8 of CPC form an integrated code dealing with the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from its non-cpmpliance. The written statement must deal specifically with each allegation of fact in the plaint and when a defendant denies any such fact, he must not do so evasively but answer the point of substance. If his denial of a fact is not specific but evasive, the said fact shall be taken to be admitted. In such an event, the admission itself being proof, no other proof is necessary. "

( 10 ). Since the denial by the defendant to the specific averment of oral