( 1 ) THE Order which has been impugned in this Writ petition is dated 23rd September, 1996 in which the hon ble Tribunal-II had dismissed the approval application of the Petitioner as a consequence of the management s failure to pay costs.

( 2 ) MS. KITTOO Bajaj, learned counsel for the respondent, at the very threshold, concedes that the order of dismissal of the Approval application on the ground of non-payment of costs may not be sustainable in view of the judgment of Division Bench of this court in LPA No. 480/00 entitled Delhi Transport corporation vs. Shri Hari Narain Giri and Anr. The hon ble Division Bench had followed the view of the apex Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. vs. Sri Ram kunwar Industrial Tribunal, Delhi and Others, AIR 1957 SC 276 holding that in terms of Section 11 (7) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the costs of the proceedings would mean costs of the entire proceedings as determined on its conclusion and not costs in a pending proceeding, nor costs to be incurred in future by a party. Single Benches of this Court have remanded cases for this very reason.

( 3 ) THE contention of Ms. Kittoo Bajaj, learned counsel for the Respondent Workmen, however, is that the present Petition ought not be entertained in view of the inordinate and unexplained delay in its filing. The facts are that the Approval application, which has been assailed in this Writ Petition, was passed on 23rd September, 1996. Thereafter, the Workmen initiated the present proceedings u/s 33 (2) (B) of the industrial Disputes Act. It is not in controversy that those proceedings were strenuously contested by the DTC/petitioner. Those proceedings came to an end on 9th May,. 2002 and the Labour Court-VII had quantified the Workmen s dues at Rs. 1,34,985/- for the period September, 1994 to August, 1997. The present writ Petition has been filed on 4th April, 2000. The period intervening between the dismissal of the approval application and the filing of the present writ Petition is, therefore, approximately four years.

( 4 ) MY attention has been drawn by Ms. Bajaj to the judgment of. the Constitution Bench in State of Madhya pradesh vs. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006. The Apex court observed that "it is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may, however, be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay, the court ought not ordinarily lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of Mandamus. . . . . . It appears to us, however, that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 of the constitution of India can be measured. The Court must consider the delay unreasonable, even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable". It will be relevant to bear in mind that the Constitution Bench was concerned with a situation where the Petitioner had voiced the grievance that he had been assessed to tax under a void statute. Even in those extraordinary circumstances, the Supreme Court had declined to overlook the laches. Ms. Kittoo Bajaj also relies, on the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and Others, air 1969 SC 329. In that case, the Apex Court again articulated that" it is well-established that the writ of Certiorari will not be granted in a case where there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party". The Court relied on Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Arbram Farewell