( 1 ) THE present petition arises out of an eviction petition filed under Section 14 (1 ) (c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In the course of hearing it appears that a statement was made on behalf of Petitioners that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. According to the Petitioners the recording of the statement was immediately ended. After hearing arguments on the same day, the rent Controller dismissed the petition holding that the petition was not maintainable under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and that, therefore, no opportunity was given for cross-examination. It is this Order that has been assailed by the Petitioners/landlord in these proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

( 2 ) AT the very threshold learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent had taken an objection pertaining to the non maintainability of the present petition under article 227 of the Constitution. It was his contention that the landlord ought to have filed an Appeal under Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Sub-section (1) of which reads as follows:

"38. Appeal to the Tribunal - (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the controller made under this Act only on questions of law to the Rent Control tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) consisting of one person only to be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the Official gazette: provided that no appeal shall lie from an order of the Controller made under section 21. "

( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the Respondent had further stated that if the petition was withdrawn with the purpose of filing of an Appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal, he would not raise the limitation as one of the grounds in opposition to the Appeal. Despite this concession learned counsel for the Petitioner had insisted that the present petition is maintainable. Arguments were heard on 5/12/2000. After they continued for some time learned counsel for the Petitioner asked for an adjournment on the ground that he would cite judgments to the effect that relief under Article 227 of the Constitution was the most appropriate relief. On the next date of hearing i. e. 7/12/2000 the Respondent again reiterated his assurance that if the present proceedings were transferred to the Rent Control Tribunal, he would not contest the appeal on the grounds of delay. This offer was again declined by learned counsel for the Petitioner whose obduracy in insisting that the present petition was well founded cannot be appreciated for the reason that similar relief could as easily have been obtained from the Rent Control Tribunal.

( 4 ) MR. A. K. Singia, Learned counsel for the Petitioner, has relied on Trimbak gangadhar Telang and another Vs. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide and others, air 1977 SC 1222, in which it was observed that

"it is a well settled rule of practice of this Court not to interfere with the exercise of discretionary power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution merely because two views are possible on the facts of the case. It is also well established that it is only when an order of a Tribunal is violative of the fundamental basic principles of justice and fair play or where a patent or flagrant error in procedure or law has crept or where the order passed results in manifest injustice, that a court can justifiably intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution. "mr. Singia relied on the underlined portions to buttress his contention that the present petition was maintainable. However, what cannot be lost sight is the fact that the supreme Court had expressed these views in the context of circumstances where an alternative and convenient remedy, such as Section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act was available. In the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus vs. Mohd. Mustaqim and others, AIR 1984 SC 38 a Coordinate Bench observed as follows:

"the petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution was wholly miscon