( 1 ) IN view of a divergence of views between two division Benches on the question, whether the third proviso to Section 4-M of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 (in short the act ) requires grant of an opportunity, that is, in the nature of a personal hearing before exercising discretion to waive part or full of the penalty, reference has been made to a larger Bench, while in Amritlal ganpatrai v. Union of India (CUP 2890/87) decided on 25/9/1987, it was observed that in the absence of any statutory requirement to that effect opportunity was not to be granted. In the present writ petition, the prima facie view of the learned judges hearing the matter was that principles of natural justice require grant of such an opportunity, we may note that in M/s. Jesus Sales corporation v. Union of India and Others AIR 1994 delhi 218, the same issue was considered and it was held by a Full Bench that an opportunity has to be given before deciding application of the third proviso to Section 4-M of the Act - It was 2nd proviso to Section 4-M of the Act at the relevant point of time, when the Full Bench took up the matter. The matter was carried to the Apex Court and in Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corporation 1996 (83) ELT 486 (S. C.), it was observed that it will be difficult to say that in every case denial of an opportunity would be violative of the principles of natural Justice.

( 2 ). We have heard Mr. G. L. Rawal, learned counsel for the petitioner. Though by passage of time the petition has become infructuous, yet in view of the fact that similar controversy has come up frequently dealing with identical provisions, we have heard him at length. It was his submission that though on a cursory reading of the decision of the Apex Court as referred to above, it would appear that the requirement was held to be not there, but that was rendered in the facts of that particular case and cannot have universal application. Me are in agreement with this submission as a detailed reading of the judgment shows the peculiar factual position which was considered by the Supreme Court and in the background facts of that case, the decision was rendered. It is trite law that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not for what logically flows from the judgment.

( 3 ). Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as Statutes. Judicial utterances are made in the settings of the facts of a particular case. There is always peril in treating words of a judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified cannons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.

( 4 ). The expression natural justice and legal justice do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law.

( 5 ). The adherence to principle of natural justice as recognised by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-juridical body embarks on determining disputes between the parties. These principles are well-settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alter am partem rule. It says that none should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principl