( 1 ) NOTICING that some judgments of different Benches - Single and division- in effect permitted compounding of offences which are non- compoundable by exercising power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 (in short, the Code), reference has been made to the larger bench,. as the learned Judge before whom the petitions were posted, expressed doubt about permissibility of such a course.

( 2 ) FACTUAL aspects need not be noted in detail, as the basic issue involved in all these cases is that proceedings were initiated for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 39/44 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 ( in short the Act) read with Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (in short, Indian Penal Code) and prayer was for quashing them as theft bill amounts have been paid.

( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for petitioners submitted that even though there may be bar for compounding of offences in terms of sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code, yet there is no bar for exercise of power under section 482 of the Code in appropriate cases to either prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure ends of justice. Similar question has been raised before the Courts and the Courts are flooded with litigation of this nature. There is no dispute on the fact that offences in question are not compoundable in view of the specific bar under sub-section (9) of section 320.

( 4 ) FEW decisions of the Apex Court which are of relevance need to be noted. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, the Apex Court held as follows:

"there is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. "again in Palaniappa Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1970 SC 1323 the issue was almost similar. The Apex Court held as follows :-

" Section 482 of the Code under which the heirs of the deceased filed the application for compensation corresponds to Section 5 61 A of the Criminal procedure Code, 1898. It saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision contained in the Statute which saves that power. This is put in another form by saying that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject matter there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern the particular subject matter. From this it will be clear that the application made by the heirs of the deceased for compensation could not have been made under section 482 since Section 357 expressly confers power on the Court to pass an order for payment of compensation in the circumstances mentioned therein"

( 5 ) IN Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 on which great emphasis was laid by learned counsel for petitioner, under the third exception carved out, it was observed as follows :

" (3) It should not be exercised as against express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code" in Simirkhia v. Dolley Mukherjee, AIR 1990 SC 1605, while considering whether the High Court is empowered to review its own decision under the purported inherent power, the Apex Court held : "the inherent power under Section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the Code and to secure ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. " xxx XXX XXX "if a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the Court cannot give a go by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction" the Apex Court referred to its earlier decision in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare