The central legal point established is that sub-letting of premises without obtaining the landlord's consent, as per the Rent Control Act, can lead to eviction.

( 1 ) THE appellant, in a second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has challenged the correctness of the order dated 6th September, 1985 passed by the learned Rent Control Tribunal in RCA No. 679 of 1984.

( 2 ) EVEN though the respondents had filed an eviction petition against the appellant on several grounds, what now survives for determination is the ground available to the respondents under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act. The same reads as under:

"14. Protection of tenant against eviction (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant: Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: (b) that the tenant has,on or after the 9th day of June, 1952,sub-let,assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord;"

( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant argued his case on 8th and 21st February, 2000 when judgement was reserved.

( 4 ). The learned Additional Rent Controller in his order dated 28th July, 1983 came to a finding of fact in paragraph 12 of the order that the petitioner had parted with possession of the suit premises in favour of a partnership firm called M/s. Plasto Type Industries.

( 5 ) THIS finding of fact was affirmed by the learned Rent Control Tribunal (for short the Tribunal) inparagraph 26 of the impugned order dated 6th September, 1985.

( 6 ) I find no reason to disturb this concurrent finding of fact arrived at by both the Courts below. The finding is neither perverse nor can it be said to be not based on the material available on record.

( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant contended that he had filed an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure for placing on record some additional evidence. A similar application had been filed by the appellant before the learned Tribunal. While dealing with this application, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that the eviction petition had been filed against the appellant in 1973 while the additional evidence that was sought to be placed on record was a partnership deed which was executed in April, 1975. In this view of the matter, the learned Tribunal concluded that the partnership deed was not at all relevant for deciding the case.

( 8 ) BEFORE me also, the learned Counsel pressed his application bearing CM No. 3463 of 1985 for leading additional evidence in the form of assessment orders passed by the Salex Tax authorities and the Income Tax authorities. Learned Counsel even took an adjournment for placing additional documents on record. The application is allowed and the additional evidence is taken on record. Unfortunately, this has been nothing but a paper chase for the appellant.

( 9 ) WHILE it is true that one of the assessment orders dated 27th October, 1969 passed by the Salex Tax authorities refers to Girdhari Lal (proprietor of the appellant) as a partner of the firm M/s. Plasto Type Industries, but this document by itself is not sufficient to controvert the finding of fact that the appellant had parted with the possession of the suit premises. In fact, it was not even the case of the appellant that he was a partner in Plasto Type Industries in 1968-69. As mentioned above, Girdhari Lal allegedly became a partner in M/s. Plasto Type Industries only in April, 1975. Consequently, I see no reason to rely upon this solitary document to upset the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by both the Courts below.

( 10 ) THE other additional documents filed by learned Counsel for the appellant came into existe