( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition challenging the order dated 16. 1. 1999 of the Metropolitan Magistrated where by the learned Magistrate has rejected the application of the petitioner praying for withdrawal of non-bailable warrants. The revision petition before me, besides challenging the order dated 16. 1. 1999, also raises question of jurisdiction.

( 2 ) IT has been argued before me by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Courts below have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint inasmuch as the cause of action which arose on the failure to make payment within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice, necessarily restricts the jurisdiction to the place where notice has been served and from where the amount has not been released. In support of this contention learned senior counsel has drawn my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, 1988 (6) SCC 514. Learned counsel relies upon that following observations in the judgment:

"5. The next question that falls for our determination is whether dishonour of the cheque on each occasion of its presentation gives rise to a fresh cause for action within the meaning for Section 142 (b) of he Act. Section 142 reads as under: "142. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 ). (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138; (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138. "

( 3 ) FROM a plain reading of the above Section, it is manifest that a competent court can take cognizance of a written complaint of an offence under Section 138 if it is made within one month of the date on which the case of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138.

( 4 ) IN a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) "cause of action" means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. Viewed in that context, the following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecutes the drawer for an offence under Section 138 of the Act:

(A) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge of a debt/liability and. the cheque was dishonoured; (b) that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period; (c) that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period ; and (d) that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.

( 8 ) IF we were to proceed on the basis of the generic meaning of the term "cause of action", certainly each of the above facts would constitute a part of the cause of action but then it is significant to note that clause (b) of Section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action and that is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The reason behind giving such a restrictive meaning is not far to seek. Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period 15 days as envisaged under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, the liability for the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month for filing the complaint under Section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two Sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142 (c) arises -- and can arise only once.

( 9 ) FROM the learned counsel wants me to