( 1 ) REVISION Petition has been filed aggrieved by the order of the Additional Rent Controller rejecting the leave to defend application of the Petitioner-tenant.

( 2 ) MR. R. P. Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner, has vehemently contended that the Petition was bad for mis-joinder of I D Khernka, the husband of the Petitioner as he was not a tenant. Another contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner was that premises were taken for composite purposes i. e. residential- cum-non-residential purposes. Main stress of the arguments of the learned counsel for the Petitioner was that the premises were not required by the Respondent bona fidely for her residence or for her family. Lastly it was contended by Mr. Bansal that the affidavit of property broker showing that the Respondent was interested in selling the property after getting it vacated from the present Petitioner has not been considered by the learned Additional Rent Controller while rejecting the application for grant of leave.

( 3 ) LEARNED Additional Rent Controller while disposing of the application of the present Petitioner had held that it was on account of the fact that Mr. I D Khemka was also claiming to be a tenant in the premises in question and was dealing with the Respondent along with his wife, Petitioner herein Smi. Saroj Khemka, therefore to avoid any complication/confusion both were impleaded as respondents in the eviction Petition. It has been further recorded by the learned Additional Rent Controller that along with the eviction Petition, Petitioner/respondent had filed lease deed which was between the Respondent and I D Khemka, although the lease deed has been disputed by Mr. Bansal. No photocopy of the lease deed, which was sought to be filed in this Court dalcd 27. 5. 1995 was filed with the leave to defend application and same was filed after hearing of the arguments on the application for leave to defend were over: Therefore, there is no force in the arguments of learned counsel for the Petitioner that lease deed was forged and that Mr. I D Khemka was not a necessary party.

( 4 ) THERE is no force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the Petitioner with regard to the purpose of letting. As per the case of the Petitioner the premises were let out in April 1987 for residential purposes and as per clause 1 (ii) of the lease deed filed along with the Petition dated 10. 4. 1986 signed by I D Khemka, Respondent No. 2 herein, it was agreed that lessee shall use the premises for the residential use of himself and the family members dependent upon him. Therefore, it was rightly recorded by the learned Additional Rent Controller that the initial purpose of letting was residential. As a matter of fact, learned Additional Rent Controller has recorded the Finding that in the affidavits filed by both Smt. Saroj Khemka, present Petitioner, and Mr. I D Khemka, Respondent No. 2 herein, the details of commercial purposes for which the premises were let out by the present Respondent to them, were not mentioned. As to what commercial activities they were carrying out in the premises in question to make the user of the premises from residential to commercial. Therefore, there is no force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the premises were let out for composite purposes.

( 5 ) THE next contention of Mr. Bansal is that the premises were not required bona fidely by the Respondent as the Respondent has settled permanently in U. S. A. and the husband of the Respondent No. 1 was a Doctor and earning a handsome amount and there is no likelihood of the Respondent to shift to India. Mr. Bansal has contended that Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short act ) is not attracted for casual visit to India by the owner/landlady of the premises. He has further contended that the short stay would not amount that the owner/landlady requires the premises bonafidely for residence as the Respo