( 1 ) INTERESTING question involved in this matter for adjudication is as to the use of word owner in Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereafter REFERRED TO as act ). Mr Ahiuwalia has contended that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in specific terms provides that a contract for sale does not by itself create any interest in or charge on such property and agreement to sell is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale deed to be registered in accordance with law.

( 2 ) BRIEFLY stating the facts of the case are that the property in question i. e. , House No. W-111a, Greater Kailash, Part-I, New Delhi was owned by Shri Sunil Kanta Chakravarty, On 29. 6. 1977 ground floor of the premises was leased out by said Shri Sunil Kanta Chakravarty to the respondent for residential purposes. On 20. 10. 086 said Shri Sunil Kanta Chakravarty agreed to sell aforesaid premises to his brother Shri Suhil Kanta Chakravarty. On 11. 2. 1987 substantial money was paid to Shri Sunil Kanta Chakravarty and agreement was written along with receipt-cum-handing over possession document. There was also a general power of attorney issued in favour of Shri Sushil Kanta Chakravarty by said Shri Sunil Kanta Chakravarty. On 31. 7. 1987 respondent was informed abouthe purchase of the said property by Shri Sushil Kanta Chakravarty. Respondent-tenant started Paying the rent to the petitioner-Shri Sushil Kanta Chakravarty and on 26. 10. 1987 respondent impleaded the petitioner as a party to his appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal for fixation of standard rent. Petition for eviction was filed by the petitioner on 26. 8. 1993 under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act against the respondent. An application was filed by respondent under Order 7 Rule II of the Civil Procedure Code claiming that Shri Sushil Kanta Chakravarty was not the owner or the property in question within the meaning of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act. Learned Additional Rent Controller vide its order dated 14. 4. 1995 dismissed the eviction petition of the petitioner on the ground that as no sale deed had been executed, therefore, petitioner was not the owner within the meaning of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act.

( 3 ) IT seems that in Suit No. 1731/1989 for specific performance, which was filed by the petitioner against his brother, Shri Sunil Kanta Chakravarty, a compromise decree was passed on 24. 4. 1995 whereas Shri Sunil Kanta Chakravarty confirmed the agreement to sell in favour of Shri Sushil Kanta Chakravarty. On 17. 7. 1997 order for execution of the sale deed was issued and the same was executed and registered on 8. 8. 1997.

( 4 ) MR. Ahiuwalia, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has contended that Section 14 (6) of the Act, which provides that where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub-section (1) on the ground specified in Clause (e) of the proviso thereto unless a period of five years have elapsed from the date of such acquisition. The policy underlying the Section and the object intended to be achieved by it was to prevent the transfer by landlord as a device to enable the purchaser to evict the tenant from the premises let out to the tenant. In support of his contentions, Mr. Ahluwalia has cited the case of V. N. Sam v. Major Ajit Kumar Poplai and Am. II (1966) DLT 321. In V. N. Sarin s case (supra) Supreme Court while underlying the policy for the\ insertion of Section 14 (6) of the Act held that it was to prevent the transfer by landlord as a device the enable the purchaser to evict the tenant from the premises. But whether word owner has to be understood in its strictest term was nowhere dealt in the said authority. I am afraid, the authority cited by the learned counsel will not help the case of the respondent. As a mater of fact, in V. N. Sarin s case (supra) Supreme Court held:-

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