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1998 Supreme(Del) 432
High Court Of Delhi
ABDUL HAMID - Appellant
Versus
CHARANJIT LAL MEHRA - Respondent
Interim Application 4220 of 1997
Decided On : 05/26/1998
ARUN BHARDWAJ, D.D.VERMA, MUKUL ROHTAGI, P.CHIDAMBARAM, R.K.AGARWAL, Singhvi, VIKAS DHAVAN, VIKASH DHAVAN, VIPIN SANGHI
AN UNAMBIGUOUS ADMISSION BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THEIR WRITTEN STATEMENT THAT THE LEASE WOULD EXPIRE BY EFFLUX OF TIME IS SUFFICIENT FOR PASSING A DECREE FOR POSSESSION UNDER ORDER 12, RULE 6 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Headnote:
ORDER 12 RULE 6 CPC - POSSESSION - LEASE - ADMISSION - DISCRETION - TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT - SECTION 105, 106, 111, 116 - SECTION 53-A - RENT CONTROL ACT - SECTION 3 - ADMISSION BY DEFENDANTS IN WRITTEN STATEMENT THAT LEASE WOULD EXPIRE BY EFFLUX OF TIME ON 2. 11. 1996 - COURT HELD THAT DEFENDANTS HAD MADE AN UNAMBIGUOUS ADMISSION THAT THEIR TENANCY WOULD EXPIRE BY EFFLUX OF TIME ON 2. 11. 1996 AND PASSED A DECREE FOR POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS UNDER ORDER 12, RULE 6 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Fact of the Case:
PLAINTIFFS FILED A SUIT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS FOR POSSESSION, ARREARS OF RENT, AND MESNE PROFITS IN RESPECT OF THE GROUND FLOOR OF PROPERTY BEARING NO. G-6, N. D. S. E. , PART-1, NEW DELHI. DEFENDANTS RELIED UPON A LEASE DEED DATED 2. 12. 1986, THOUGH PLAINTIFFS DENIED ITS EXECUTION OR LEGAL VALIDITY. DEFENDANTS ADMITTED IN THEIR WRITTEN STATEMENT THAT THE RATE OF RENT WAS RS. 6,000. 00 PER MONTH. CLAUSE-2 OF THE LEASE DEED STATED THAT THE LEASE PERIOD WAS FROM 2. 12. 1986 TO 1. 11. 1996.
Finding of the Court:
THE COURT HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD MADE AN UNAMBIGUOUS ADMISSION THAT THEIR TENANCY WOULD EXPIRE BY EFFLUX OF TIME ON 2. 11. 1996. THE COURT FURTHER HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS COULD NOT CLAIM ANY PROTECTION UNDER SECTION 53-A OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT AS IT WOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE AS A DEFENSE TO PROTECT THEIR POSSESSION AND NOT TO CREATE A TITLE OR CONFER ANY RIGHTS AGAINST THE LESSOR AFTER 2. 11. 1996.
Issues: WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS' ADMISSION IN THE WRITTEN STATEMENT THAT THE LEASE WOULD EXPIRE BY EFFLUX OF TIME ON 2. 11. 1996 WAS UNAMBIGUOUS AND SUFFICIENT FOR PASSING A DECREE FOR POSSESSION UNDER ORDER 12, RULE 6 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Ratio Decidendi: THE COURT RELIED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: * ORDER 12, RULE 6 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE EMPOWERS THE COURT TO PASS A DECREE ON ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PARTIES. * AN ADMISSION NEED NOT BE EXPRESSLY MADE IN THE PLEADINGS, BUT CAN ALSO BE CONSTRUCTIVE. * THE DISCRETION TO PASS A DECREE UNDER ORDER 12, RULE 6 IS TO BE EXERCISED JUDICIOUSLY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE. * SECTION 53-A OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT IS A DEFENSE TO PROTECT POSSESSION AND DOES NOT CREATE A TITLE OR CONFER ANY RIGHTS AGAINST THE LESSOR.
Final Decision: THE COURT PASSED A DECREE FOR POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS AND DIRECTED THE DEFENDANTS TO HAND OVER THE POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE ORDER.
( 1 ) THE suit was filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants for possession, arrears of rent and mesne profits in respect of the ground floor of property bearing No. G-6, N. D. S. E. , Part-1, New Delhi. Issues had been framed in this matter and the matter was listed in the category of finals . Applicants/ plaintiffs filed an application under the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short cpc ) stating, inter alia, that the defendants have relied upon the documents purporting to be a lease deed dated 2. 12. 1986, though, the plaintiffs have denied the execution or legal validity of said lease deed. In para-2 of the reply on Merit in the written statement, the defendants have also admitted that the rate of rent was Rs. 6,000. 00 per month. In the aforesaid lease deed dated 2. 12. 1986, Clause-2 thereof reads as under :
( 2 ) THAT the period of this lease has been fixed at 119 months beginning from 2. 12. 1986 and ending on 1. 11. 1996. As such, the present lease deed shall expire by efflux of time on 2. 11. 1996.
2. On the basis of this clause of the lease deed put up by the defendants, Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs, has argued that the defendants have made an admission that their tenancy will expire by efflux of time on2. 11. 1996andhavingadmittedtherentofthepremisesinquestion,nothingmore is required for the parties to argue the matter and judgment on admission may be passed under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code directing the defendants to vacate the premises and the matters regarding the arrears of rent and mesne profits may be decided after hearing final arguments. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs/applicants has also contended that the provisions contained in Order 12, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code is to enable the parties to obtain speedy judgment at least to the extent of relief on which unambiguous and unequivocal admission has been made by the opposite party. Mr. Rohtagi has also contended that even though the lease deed which was propounded by the defendants was an unregistered document and as per Section 49 of the Registration Act, documents, which are not registered, are inadmissible as evidence of a transaction affecting the party, however, when the said document was put forward by the defendants themselves that document can be looked into by the Court for passing a judgment regarding the possession.
( 3 ) LENGTHY arguments were advanced by late Dr. Shankar Ghose and later on by Mr. P. Chidambaram on behalf of defendants, inter ulia, that issues were framed on 6. 11. 1992 and the parties have led their evidence and the matter is listed in the finals , therefore, the present application has been made mala fidely. It has been contended by non-applicants/defendants that in such circumstances, it would be appropriate to decide the suit by adjudicating all the issues that have been framed and in support of his contentions, has cited Punjab Natiotul Bank and Anr. v. S. Kartar Singh, 66 (1997) DLT 857, which was later on followed by Kanti Singh and Ors. v. Project and Enuipment Corporilton of India Limited l997 VIAD (Delhi) 153-Another submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the defendants was that the written statement has to be read as a whole, therefore, taking into totality the defence taken by the defendants, it could not be said that there was an admission which warrants a judgment amounting to decree of possession in favour of the plaintiffs. In support of his arguments, he has cite") the case of Dudh Nath Pandey (Dead by LRs) v. Suresh Chandra Bhattasali (Dead by L " AIR 1986 SC 1509.
( 4 ) IT was contended by Mr. Clidambaram that no admission has been made in the written statement that lease expired by efflux of time on 2. 11. 1996. In the alternative, he has contended that even in the application filed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff has denied the execution as well as the
