Dalveer Bhandari, J. (ORAL)

( 1 ) IN these writ petitions, the Union of India has challenged the orders passed by the Presiding Officers, Labour Courts awarding the workmen the difference of pay w. e. f. date they acquired temporary status till they were paid regular pay scale.

( 2 ) THE workmen in these writ petitions had filed applications under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Courts claiming difference of wages from the date they acquired temporary status till they were appointed on regular pay scale.

( 3 ) THE petitioners herein contested the claims of the workmen and filed written statements against the claims of the workmen contending that the workmen were "not entitled to the wages of regular pay scale. According to the petitioners the workmen herein were casually employed and were only entitled to statutory daily wages.

( 4 ) AFTER hearing all the parties, in these cases, the Presiding Officers of the Labour Court granted the claims of the workmen. Aggrieved by these orders the Union of India have preferred these petitions.

( 5 ) IT is alleged in these petitions that the Presiding Officers have very limited jurisdiction under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Presiding Officers could not have arrogated to themselves the functions of the Industrial Tribunal in a reference under Section 10 by proceeding to determine the workmen s right instead of computing the claims under the valid order of the competent authority. It was further argued that there has been no adjudication or recognition of the claims of the workmen, therefore, the Labour Court in these proceedings under Section 33-C (2) of the Act could not have decreed their claims.

( 6 ) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and examined relevant provisions of the Act and decided cases. The respondent workmen did not appear despite service.

( 7 ) IN Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs P. S. Rajagopalan AIR 1964. SC 743 the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court clearly pointed out that the sole purpose of section 33-C (22) is the implementation or execution of the award and that the power of the Labour Court in a proceeding under Section 33-C (2) being akin to that of the Executing Court, the Labour Court would be within its rights to interpret the Award or settlement on which a workmen bases his claim under section 33-C (2) like the power of the Executing Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. Vs Gopal Bhiva AIR 1964 SC 752. That the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed under section 33-C (2) must be one already adjudicated upon or provided for and that, while acting under that provisions, the Labour Court cannot arrogate itself the functions of adjudication of the dispute relating to the claim, was made further clear by the Apex Court in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. Vs Rameshwar AIR 1968 SC 218 and Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. Vs Workmen (1974) 4 SCC 696.

( 8 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the same issue in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Ganesh Razak and Another 1995 (1) SCC 235. Their Lordships held that:

"where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under section 33-C (2) of the Act. The Lobour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen s entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power undersection 33-C (2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognized by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambigu

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